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ARTICLES
Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement
JULIE E. COHEN*
ABSTRACT
In an effort to control flows of unauthorized information, the major copyright
industries are pursuing a range of strategies designed to distribute copyright
enforcement functions across a wide range of actors and to embed those
functions within communications networks, protocols, and devices. Some of
these strategies have received considerable academic and public scrutiny, but
much less attention has been paid to the ways in which all of them overlap and
intersect with one another. This Article offers a framework for theorizing that
process. The distributed extension of intellectual property enforcement into
private spaces and throughout communications networks can be understood as
a new, hybrid species of disciplinary regime that locates the justification for its
pervasive reach in a permanent state of crisis. This hybrid regime derives its
force neither primarily from centralized authority nor primarily from decentral-
ized, internalized norms, but instead from a set of coordinated processes for
authorizing flows of information. Although the success of this project is not yet
assured, its odds of success are by no means as remote as skeptics have
suggested. Power to implement crisis management in the decentralized market-
place for digital content arises from a confluence of private and public interests
and is amplified by the dynamics of technical standards processes. The emer-
gent regime of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement has profound
implications for the production of the networked information society.
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INTRODUCTION
In an effort to control flows of unauthorized information, the major copyright
industries are pursuing a range of strategies designed to distribute copyright
enforcement functions across a wide range of actors and to embed those
functions within communications networks, protocols, and devices. Some of
these strategies have received considerable academic and public scrutiny, but
much less attention has been paid to the ways in which all of them overlap and
intersect with one another. That subject, I will argue, deserves far more careful
consideration. The emerging regime of pervasively distributed copyright enforce-
ment is not simply aimed at defining the boundaries of legal entitlements, nor at
creating and rationalizing information flows within markets. It seeks to produce
not only willing vendors and consumers, but also tractable ones, and it seeks
these changes not merely at the behavioral level, but at the infrastructural level
as well. The interplay between the strategies of pervasively distributed copy-
right enforcement thus frames important choices about the kind of information
society we want to have.
Because pervasively distributed copyright enforcement represents more than
just a change in markets, evaluating it requires that we look beyond literatures
about markets to literatures about social ordering. The framework that I will
suggest for theorizing pervasively distributed copyright enforcement as social
ordering is informed substantially by the work of Michel Foucault and Anthony
Giddens. Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement can be understood as a
species of disciplinary regime similar in some respects to those that Foucault
sought to understand. It is not, however, exactly like either of the disciplinary
regimes identified by Foucault. Instead, it represents a new, hybrid type: a mode
of normalized discipline that locates the justification for its pervasive reach in a
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permanent state of crisis. This hybrid regime derives its force neither primarily
from centralized authority nor primarily from decentralized, internalized norms,
but instead from a set of coordinated processes for authorizing flows of informa-
tion. Although the success of this project is not yet assured, the model of social
change elaborated by Giddens suggests that its odds of success are by no means
remote. Power to implement crisis management in the marketplace for digital
content arises from the self-interested actions of market participants and is
amplified by the dynamics of technical standards processes.
The emergent model of social ordering has profound implications for the
production of the networked information society. Pervasively distributed copy-
right enforcement invades, disrupts, and casually rearranges the boundaries of
personal spaces and of the intellectual and cultural activities played out within
those spaces. This process threatens to produce, in turn, a larger geography of
information space that is increasingly standardized. Finally, it promises to
re-educate us to accept these changes as necessary, and eventually to perceive
constraint and standardization as natural attributes of the information environ-
ment, if indeed we pause to think about them at all.
Important questions about the costs of this shift, and about alternatives,
should not be swept aside by the rhetoric of exigency. Processes for authorizing
flows of information are foundational to any networked information environ-
ment, but the precise forms that those processes will take are still undecided.
This Article offers a plea for more careful attention to the experiential and
political implications of a shift to crisis management, and to disciplinary
alternatives that embrace unpredictability and imperfection.
I. THE STRATEGIES OF PERVASIVELY DISTRIBUTED COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT
In an effort to prevent online copyright infringement and protect established
business models, the major copyright industries have developed and aggres-
sively pursued a portfolio of strategies designed to implement a regime that I
will call pervasively distributed copyright enforcement. These strategies rely on
a range of tools including technologies that restrict the range of permitted
information use, contractual regimes for authorizing “compliant” implementa-
tions of those technologies, legal prohibitions against interfering with the
resulting techno-contractual regimes, other legal rules broadly distributing respon-
sibility for policing communications networks, and publicly inculcated norms of
appropriate user behavior. In aggregate, they are designed systematically to shift
the locus of control over intellectual consumption and communication away
from individuals and independent technology vendors and toward purveyors of
copyrighted entertainment goods. Some of these strategies have received consid-
erable public and scholarly attention, while others have not. Some are, and are
intended to be, highly visible, while others are, and are intended to be, largely
invisible to the public eye. Here I will be concerned less with the details of any
particular strategy and more with their cumulative effect.
It is important to stress at the outset that each of the strategies that I will
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describe is evolving and contested. Over time, some have waxed in importance
while others have waned. What is presented here is a particular, increasingly
unified regulatory agenda developed and steadily advanced by the content
industries over the course of the past decade. This agenda is consistent with, and
is intended to cement, the larger agenda of commodification of information
goods pursued by these industries. Whether pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement will become reality, and to what extent, are questions that are yet
to be determined. Many technically sophisticated observers believe that uncon-
trolled “darknets” will always evade the content industries’ reach.1 I take no
position on whether that is so; as I will show, the possibility of digital samizdat
does not undercut, but instead reinforces, the argument presented here, which
concerns the baseline held out to the average user of digital information as the
alternative to lawlessness.
The strategies of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement may be
provisionally categorized into six groups, according to the behaviors that each
group primarily targets. Each set of enforcement strategies is internally heteroge-
neous, by which I mean both that each employs multiple regulatory modalities
and that each targets and seeks to stabilize relations among a variety of actors
and objects.2 In this respect my methodology differs from the prevailing
approach within the scholarly literatures on copyright and cyberspace law,
which classifies regulatory strategies according to the four-part taxonomy of
regulatory modalities developed by Lawrence Lessig.3 As I hope to demon-
strate, an analysis of copyright enforcement that analyzes these modalities
separately would not capture the ways in which they intersect.
A. SURFACE-LEVEL TECHNOLOGICAL RESTRICTIONS
The first set of strategies revolves around what I will call “surface-level”
implementation of automated restrictions on digital content. These restrictions—
variously known as copy-protection technologies, technical protection measures
(TPMs), and digital rights management (DRM)—operate at the level of indi-
vidual media files, and restrict the actions that users may take with the files.
Because they operate at surface level, implementing these restrictions does not
require the direct involvement of computer operating system developers, micro-
processor companies, or even middleware vendors. Instead, surface-level TPMs
1. See Peter Biddle et al., The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2002 ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (2002), http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/
darknet5.doc; see also Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against
the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 635 (2004).
2. See generally John Law, Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese
Expansion, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 111, 111–34 (Wiebe Bijker et al.
eds., 1987) (arguing that technology-based regulation operates by enrolling heterogeneous elements
into coordinated networks).
3. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85–95 (1999); see, e.g., R. Polk Wagner,
On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457 (2005).
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are developed and implemented at the application level and in freestanding
consumer electronics equipment via licensing processes coordinated by copy-
right interests and their designated technology partners. Within these technical-
contractual regimes, the relevant technical standards are held as trade secrets.
Licensees recruited into these regimes must agree to preserve secrecy, and their
implementations of the standards must satisfy associated criteria of robustness.4
So far, surface-level protection strategies have produced some notable fail-
ures, but also some notable successes. The most highly publicized and widely
criticized efforts to implement surface-level technological restrictions have
occurred within the recording industry. Over the past few years, the major
industry players have experimented with a variety of copy-protection technolo-
gies for CD releases. Because copy-protected CDs typically will not play on the
full range of equipment now used for playing back unprotected CDs, music
consumers have resisted them.5 New copy-protections have been hacked almost
as rapidly as they have appeared, and industry efforts to develop a universal,
more robust standard for technical protection of music files have failed. Ven-
tures in online music distribution have deployed surface-level protection strate-
gies more successfully, however. Most of these services, including Apple’s
much-hyped iTunes program, offer downloads in proprietary formats tied to
specific digital music devices.6
A more successful example of surface-level technological restriction is the
encryption system built into DVD players and incorporated in all prerecorded
DVDs. This encryption system prevents copying and also incorporates a system
of “region coding” designed to preserve geographic price discrimination. Both
the copy-protection and region-coding features of the system are enforced by
technical rules that prohibit play on any noncompliant DVD player.7 The
4. See TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE RE-ALIGNMENT OF DIGITAL CULTURE ch. 8
(forthcoming 2007).
5. Some early versions of surface-level protection prevented playback using a personal computer or
accompanying peripheral device. See Amy Harmon, CD-Protection Complaint Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2002, at C8; P.J. Huffstutter & Jon Healey, Suit Filed Against Record Firms, L.A. TIMES, June
14, 2002, at C3; Brenda Sandburg, Milberg Weiss Files Suit Over CDs With No-Copy Technology,
RECORDER, June 17, 2002, at 1. More recent versions allow computer playback using approved media
players that incorporate the copy-protection. As an additional concession to wary consumers, the
technology permits a limited amount of home copying, but the record labels have disclosed that
planned upgrades will substantially reduce that amount. See John Borland, Copy-Blocked CD Tops U.S.
Charts, CNET NEWS.COM, June 17, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5238208.html; John Borland,
Labels to Dampen CD Burning?, CNET NEWS.COM, June 2, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-
5224090.html.
6. See Peter Lewis, Drop a Quarter in the Internet, FORTUNE, Mar. 22, 2004, at 56; Rob Pegoraro,
Apple Comes Closer to Perfect Pitch, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at F07, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A8159-2003May2; see also Scott Banerjee & Brian Garrity,
Napster, Apple in Campus Deals, BILLBOARD, July 31, 2004, at 6 (describing several major universities’
entry into partnership agreements with particular digital music services).
7. See Matt Lake, How It Works: Tweaking Technology to Stay Ahead of the Film Pirates, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at G9; Doug Mellgren, Acquittal in DVD Decoding: Norwegian Teen Created
Program So He Could View Film on Computer, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 8, 2003, at 3D; John
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technical standards were developed by a consortium of the major studios and
are currently administered and enforced by a private membership association,
the DVD Copy Control Association (DVD-CCA), that licenses the technology.
The success of the technical-contractual regime administered by the DVD-
CCA is not due to its technical efficacy in any absolute sense. The copy-
protection algorithm, known as the Content Scramble System (CSS) has been
broken, and the decryption algorithm, known as DeCSS, is widely available on
the Internet if one knows where to look. Most people don’t do this, though, and
this appears to be a function of two related factors: the technology’s universality
and its perceived normalcy. Because the deliberately designed limitations have
been in place from the moment that DVD players were first marketed to
consumers, the operation of the regime administered by the DVD-CCA is
effectively invisible to end users; it is “just the way things are.”
Surface-level restrictions might, but need not, incorporate surveillance func-
tionality that reports back to the content provider about users’ activities. So far,
surveillance seems to have occurred principally for purposes more directly
connected to marketing than to enforcement. An early version of the RealNet-
works media player collected and reported information about the system on
which it was installed, including the number and titles of music files stored on
the system and the types of portable music players installed.8 The “SmartDown-
load” software included with the 1998 version of Netscape’s Communicator
web browser recorded every web site visited by users and transmitted that
information back to Netscape.9 Both of these incidents provoked intense public
outcry and culminated in expensive litigation asserting a variety of privacy
claims. Perhaps for this reason, surveillance does not appear to play a role in
many current surface-level enforcement initiatives, which focus more narrowly
on preventing unauthorized actions.
Surface-level restrictions also may incorporate other, more aggressive types
of functionality. In October 2005, a researcher discovered that media player
software bundled with a number of Sony’s recent CD releases was surrepti-
tiously installing third-party rights management software on users’ computers
and employing a technique known as a rootkit, more commonly used by
spammers and spyware distributors, to conceal that fact.10 After a period of
intense activity, security researchers determined that in addition to enforcing
copying restrictions encoded on the Sony CDs, the software also interfered with
the ripping of unprotected media files from other sources. In addition, the
Borland, Studios Race to Choke DVD Copying, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 4, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-
1023-828449.html.
8. Greg Miller, RealNetworks Breached Privacy, 3 Suits Contend, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at C1.
9. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306
F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that clickwrap agreement giving consent to the monitoring was
unenforceable because of curable defects in contract formation).
10. See Matthew Fordhal, Sony Patch Reveals Its Anti-Piracy Files on PCs, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
2005, at D5; Mark’s Sysinternals Blog, http://www.sysinternals.com/blog/ (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04).
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design of the software afforded a hidden “back door” to users’ computer
systems for viruses and other forms of malware. No uninstall utility was
included with the software, and attempting to remove the files from an affected
computer could corrupt its operating system, disabling the CD drive entirely.11
In the ensuing uproar, Sony and its third-party vendor released patches to enable
removal of the software and recalled the affected CDs from stores.12 However,
Sony did not pledge to forego surreptitious technical protection efforts in the
future, and several other major entertainment providers vigorously asserted both
the need and the right to employ such efforts. Spyware techniques are currently
under intense scrutiny by Congress, but the major entertainment industries have
urged that any law enacted to regulate spyware should exempt software in-
stalled for rights management purposes.13
B. PRESSURE ON INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS
A second set of strategies for pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
targets third-party technology companies whose products and services are
perceived to facilitate particularly high levels of infringement. In broad brush,
this campaign has two complementary goals. First, it seeks to keep protected
content protected. The primary vehicle for accomplishing this goal is the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),14 which penalizes providers of technolo-
gies that enable users to gain unauthorized access to protected content. Second,
it seeks to minimize the availability of tools for reproducing, distributing, and
manipulating unprotected content. Equipment and services that give users this
freedom—including digital video recorders, digital music players, and CD and
DVD burners—work at cross purposes with the effort to shift the market toward
protected content. In an effort to assert control over these segments of the
technological marketplace, the entertainment industries have invoked a set of
doctrines within copyright law that create liability for facilitating an unaccept-
ably high degree of copyright infringement.
The DMCA advances the goal of keeping protected content protected in three
interrelated ways: It prohibits circumvention of technological measures that
effectively control access to copyrighted works, bans the manufacture and
11. See Brian Krebs, Study of Sony Anti-Piracy Software Triggers Uproar, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2005, at
D05.
12. See Fordhal, supra note 10; Jefferson Graham, Sony to Pull Controversial CDs, Offer Swap,
USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2005, at 1B. To add injury to insult, researchers soon discovered that the removal
tool created even more “gaping” system security holes. Posting of J. Alex Halderman & Ed Felten to
Freedom to Tinker, Sony’s Web-Based Uninstaller Opens a Big Security Hole; Sony to Recall Discs,
http://freedom-to-tinker.com/ (Nov. 15, 2005, 7:07).
13. For one such provision, see Spy Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. § 5(b)(2) (2005); see also Todd
Martens & Brian Garrity, Consumers Sing DRM Blues, BILLBOARD, Nov. 12, 2005, at 6 (quoting
industry sources as confirming that “hiding software on computers is standard” because “‘the object is
to make it more difficult to circumvent’”).
14. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863–76
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1202 (2000)).
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distribution of technologies that might enable copyrighted content to be stripped
free of its protective coating, and forbids the knowing removal of “copyright
management information,” including information about the terms and condi-
tions for use of the work.15 The DMCA was enacted as part of U.S. accession to
a 1996 treaty that requires effective legal protection for technological measures
applied to copyrighted works, and has served as a model for implementing
legislation in other countries.16 The U.S.-based entertainment industries also
have spearheaded an effort to export the model of the DMCA to other countries
via bilateral trade agreements.17
DMCA-style laws do not physically or electronically prevent the spread of
unprotected content or circumvention tools, and for that reason some critics
consider them ineffective. For example, the DMCA did not prevent the develop-
ment and widespread Internet distribution of DeCSS, the unauthorized program
that decrypts prerecorded DVDs. Even after successful and widely-publicized
litigation against several high-profile U.S. distributors of DeCSS, both the
algorithm and movies decrypted with it remain widely available.18 Although the
costs of violating DMCA-style prohibitions may be trivial from an individual
user’s perspective, however, they are far more significant for would-be legiti-
mate providers of digital media equipment and services. The content industries
have filed a steady progression of DMCA lawsuits against technology compa-
nies whose products interfered with technological protection measures.19 The
potential costs of DMCA litigation also have affected independent researchers
who study the technological systems that the DMCA protects; many of these
researchers report having changed their research programs to avoid legal con-
flict.
15. Id.
16. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 11 Stat. 2860,
36 I.L.M. 65 (1997). Some commentators have argued that the treaty’s requirements would be satisfied
by substantially less draconian restrictions. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the
Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
519, 530–32 (1999). The point seems on the way to becoming moot, however.
17. See U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.8, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544
(2005); U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., art. 14.4(7)–(8), Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544
(2005); Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.4(7)(a), May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M.
1248 (2004); U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.7(5)–(6), June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
1026 (2003); U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.4(7)(a), May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
1026 (2003); U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4(13), Oct. 24, 2000; see also Free
Trade Area of the Americas Draft Agreement ch. 20, art. 22, Nov. 21, 2003.
18. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d
sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); see also DVD Copy
Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241, 255 (2004) (denying injunctive relief on trade secrecy
grounds against web site operator who posted DeCSS because DeCSS was widely available at the time
the lawsuit was filed and therefore the information it contained could no longer qualify as a trade
secret).
19. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 3, 2004); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal.
2004); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
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Technologies that allow copying, manipulation, and distribution of unpro-
tected content do not implicate the DMCA; these technologies and related
services violate the law only if there is a sufficiently direct link to copyright
infringement under either of two theories of indirect liability. By analogy to the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior, a third party is vicariously liable
for copyright infringement if it receives a direct financial benefit from the
infringement and has the right and opportunity to control the infringing con-
duct.20 Alternatively, a third party is considered a contributory copyright in-
fringer if, with knowledge of the infringing conduct, it materially facilitates or
participates in the conduct.21 For many years, this doctrinal structure effectively
shielded technology providers from liability. The provider of standalone equip-
ment, such as a CD burner, typically had neither an ongoing right to control
uses of its products nor knowledge of specific acts of infringement that occurred
after sale. Equipment providers did know that their products would be used to
infringe copyrights, but in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
the Supreme Court ruled that constructive knowledge of infringement could not
be imputed to an equipment provider as long as the product was “capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.”22
In a carefully designed litigation campaign, the entertainment industries have
eroded the certainty afforded by the Sony safe harbor. The campaign targeted a
set of particularly unsympathetic defendants: providers of p2p file-sharing
software that enabled millions of users to exchange digital media files directly
with one another. In a series of widely-publicized lawsuits against the p2p
providers known as Napster, Aimster, and Grokster, the industry plaintiffs
emphasized both the sheer volume of infringement and the defendants’ failure
to implement design changes that might minimize infringement. This strategy
produced a circuit split on the proper interpretation of Sony. Under one interpre-
tation, a contributory infringement defendant need only show that its product is
capable of future noninfringing uses that are qualitatively substantial.23 Under
the other, it must show current, quantitatively substantial noninfringing uses,
and also must show that there were not reasonable steps it could have taken to
reduce the level of infringement.24 Many technology developers can pass the
first test; fewer can survive the second. When the Supreme Court granted
review in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,25 technology develop-
ers hoped at minimum for a clearer statement of the applicable rule. Instead, the
20. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
21. See Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162.
22. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
23. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162–66 (9th Cir.
2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2789–92 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1020–22 (9th Cir. 2001).
24. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649–53 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom.
Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 540 U.S. 1102 (2004).
25. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2779–80.
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Court declined to resolve the disagreement, and compounded the uncertainty by
articulating an alternative basis for contributory infringement liability based on
intent to induce infringement. The contours of the new inducement test are
poorly defined. In particular, the Court’s opinion is vague on the critical
question of a technology developer’s design obligations to minimize infringe-
ment.26 After Grokster, it is unclear what a developer must show to avoid
liability under either theory.
The debate about the proper interpretation of Sony and Grokster, moreover, has
overlooked the extent to which developers of networked communications technolo-
gies may be ineligible to invoke Sony’s protection. In the case of products that
incorporate a degree of ongoing networked control, a copyright plaintiff need not
resort to arguing constructive knowledge or bad intent. If ongoing networked control
enables specific knowledge of infringing conduct and affords an opportunity to
prevent or minimize it, liability will arise under the traditional theory of contributory
infringement, and possibly under the theory of vicarious liability as well.27 Many
digital media technologies incorporate elements of ongoing networked control for
technical and business reasons such as delivery of software updates and provision of
technical support. For these products and services, there are thus three separate and
independent ways in which a copyright plaintiff can establish the requisites of a
contributory liability claim.
All of these potential sources of legal liability cast a pall over innovation in
high-technology markets that reaches far beyond providers of p2p file-sharing technolo-
gies. For technology developers, the case of the ReplayTV digital video recorder
provides an object lesson in the risks of incurring the content industries’ displeasure.
The ReplayTV gave users the ability to skip commercials automatically upon play-
back and the ability to share recorded programming with other ReplayTV users. A
group of movie and television studios sued the ReplayTV’s manufacturer, SonicBlue,
for enabling infringement of their copyrights, and embarked upon a lengthy and
expensive discovery campaign.28 SonicBlue eventually filed for bankruptcy and sold
its ReplayTV technology and business to a major consumer electronics company.29
ReplayTV’s new owners promptly agreed to remove the two features that were the
subject of the lawsuit.30 In the wake of this victory, the studios stepped up pressure on
TiVo, the leader in the digital video recorder market, to modify its product to make
commercial-skipping more difficult. Eventually, TiVo announced that it would com-
ply with these requests.31
26. Id. at 2781 & n.12.
27. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162–66; Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649, 653.
28. See Farhad Manjoo, Sonicblue Freed From Monitoring, WIRED.COM, June 3, 2002, http://
www.wired.com/news/business/1,52934-0.html.
29. See Eric A. Taub, ReplayTV’s New Owners Drop Features That Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2003, at C3; Jim Hu, Sonicblue Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, CNET NEWS.COM, March 21,
2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1047-993647.html.
30. See Taub, supra note 29.
31. See Gina Piccalo, TiVo Will No Longer Skip Past Advertisers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A1.
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Finally, the entertainment industries also have used indirect copyright infringe-
ment lawsuits to target entities that provide essential business services to
recalcitrant independents. In two highly-publicized lawsuits following its Nap-
ster victory, the recording industry has sought to call Napster’s financial backers
to account for their purported complicity in Napster’s violations.32 The same
federal district judge who presided over the Napster litigation rejected the
financiers’ arguments that this would amount to creation of a novel and chilling
theory of “tertiary liability” for copyright infringement and ruled that the
lawsuit could proceed to the discovery phase.33 In another court, an online
pornographer sued an age verification service used by competitors that made
copied, infringing materials available to their subscribers.34 Also worth noting
in this category is a malpractice lawsuit by failed Internet music venture
MP3.com against its own legal counsel, premised on the theory that MP3.com’s
business model was so clearly infringing that its lawyers’ advice to proceed
with the business model fell below the generally accepted standard of profes-
sional care.35 So far these lawsuits have produced mixed results, and judges
uniformly have held that the traditional requirements for indirect liability must
be met. Once again, however, this litigation strategy is not designed simply to
produce favorable law on the books, but more generally to cause venture
capitalists and service firms to adopt a more cautious stance toward their
dealings with maverick technology companies. Whether it has succeeded in that
regard is harder to determine.
C. “TRUSTED SYSTEMS” FUNCTIONALITY
The third set of strategies for pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
seeks to move automated enforcement functions progressively deeper into the
logical and physical layers of the user’s electronic environment. Such “trusted
systems” efforts are, and are designed to be, far more impervious to hacker
workarounds. They are also far more inhospitable to unauthorized technologies
that an independent third party might seek to market. They are, however, far
more complicated to implement. Successfully operationalizing trusted systems
functionality across the broad range of personal computing and consumer
32. See Roger Parloff, Killer App: Thanks to Its Ballyhooed Napster Alliance, Bertelsmann Faces
More than $17 Billion in Copyright Lawsuits, FORTUNE, Sept. 1, 2003, at 111; Dan Primack, Paying for
Downloading Music: Hummer Winblad Is Still Dealing with the Consequences of Its $15 Million
Investment in Napster, VENTURE CAP. J., Mar. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 56830.
33. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (order denying
motion to dismiss).
34. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also
John Schwartz, The Pornography Industry vs. Digital Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at 31
(describing other lawsuits by Perfect 10). The parties reached a confidential settlement.
35. See Sonia K. Katyal, A Legal Malpractice Claim by MP3.com: In the Changing Area of
Cyberlaw, Is a Crystal Ball Necessary to Avoid Liability?, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Feb. 7, 2002, http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020207_katyal.html. The case was settled by confidential agree-
ment.
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electronic equipment now in use requires the cooperation of major sectors of the
software, computer and communications industries. So far, the track record of
these initiatives is mixed.
A variety of trusted systems projects are currently underway. Some focus on
implementing controls at the operating system layer, while others seek to hard-wire
trusted systems functionality into every kind of equipment that users might employ to
access copyrighted content. Microsoft’s internal project, which has undergone several
name changes over the years, is perhaps the most highly publicized example of such
an initiative. Designated as a security system, its core functionality revolves around
standards for authenticating “trusted” programs and files. Although some standards
would be set by users, others would be set to the specifications of Microsoft and its
licensing partners, which could include providers of a broad range of copyrighted
content.36 Intel’s LaGrande project is exploring the inclusion of control-enabling
standards in the microprocessors used in personal computer systems.37 Other efforts
to develop and implement trusted systems controls are more collaborative, and
include: the Trusted Computing Group (“TCG”),38 a joint venture of Microsoft, Intel,
AMD, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Sony, and Sun Microsystems that seeks to coordinate
development of trusted systems standards for personal computing platforms; the 5C
alliance,39 a joint venture of Hitachi, Intel, Matsushita, Sony, and Toshiba that seeks to
develop trusted systems standards for digital broadcasting; the Digital Media Project40
and the Coral Consortium,41 both of which seek to develop standards for moving
protected content across different consumer platforms; and the Copy Protection
Technical Working Group,42 a more broad-based industry effort to coordinate all
types of trusted systems research and development.
36. See Andy Dorman, Trusted Computing Architectures, NETWORK MAG., July 1, 2005, at 53; Neil
McIntosh, Online: Old Bill’s Police Tactics, THE GUARDIAN, July 4, 2002, at 7; Michael J. Miller, Hands
on with the Next Windows: Longhorn No Longer. Windows Vista Is Now Looming Large, PC MAG.,
Sept. 6, 2005, at 14; Arif Mohamed, Who Can You Trust?, CPTR. WEEKLY, Apr. 26, 2005, at 40; Mary Jo
Foley, Microsoft: ‘Palladium’ Is Still Alive and Kicking, EXTREMETECH.COM, May 5, 2004, http://
www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1558,1586312,00.asp; Robert Lemos, What’s in a Name? Not Palla-
dium, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 24, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1001_3-982127.html.
37. See Chris Gaither, Intel Chip to Include Antipiracy Features, Some Still Fear Privacy of Users
Will Be Violated, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2002, at C3; Greg Sandoval & Matthew Fordhal, Apple’s
Chip Switch Could Open New Window for Macs, TECH. REVIEW, June 13, 2005, http://www.techreview.
com/articles/05/06/ap/ap_061305.asp; Nick Stam, Inside Intel’s Secretive ‘LaGrande’ Project, EXTREME-
TECH.COM, Sept. 19, 2003, http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,3973,1274197,00.asp; Nick Stam,
Tomorrow’s CPUs Today, EXTREMETECH.COM, July 20, 2005, http://www.extremetech.com/article2/
0,1697,1839315,00.asp; see also John Clyman, Making Computing Trustworthy, PC MAG., Nov. 11,
2003, at 97 (discussing both LaGrande and Microsoft’s NGSCB); Alexander Wolfe, Up the Value
Chain—Systems Builders Seek Technology Edge in Bid to Differentiate, VARBUSINESS, May 16, 2005,
at 37 (noting that the new Microsoft and Intel technologies are designed to be compatible).
38. Trusted Computing Group, http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org.
39. See HITACHI, LTD. ET AL., 5C DIGITAL TRANSMISSION CONTENT PROTECTION WHITE PAPER (1998),
http://www.dtcp.com/data/wp_spec.pdf; Digital Transmission Licensing Administration, http://
www.dtcp.com/.
40. Digital Media Project Website, http://www.dmpf.org.
41. Coral Consortium, http://www.coral-interop.org.
42. Copy Protection Technical Working Group, http://cptwg.org.
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The most hotly debated aspect of trusted systems strategies for pervasively
distributed copyright enforcement has concerned the role of government in
coordinating their implementation. Although the entertainment industries have
vigorously asserted that they are best positioned both to develop the relevant
standards and to establish procedures for licensing compliant implementations,
they have repeatedly failed to secure a private consensus on these and other
issues. The asserted goal of building a single standard into the network has been
stymied by the parties’ distrust of one another, and by inter-industry struggles
for market position. As a result, they have turned to government authorities to
solve bargaining breakdown problems.
Whether and how governments will become involved in trusted systems develop-
ment are unresolved questions. In the U.S., the entertainment industries have repeat-
edly requested the enactment of laws mandating the development and adoption of
content protection standards. An initial effort to secure a broad mandate covering all
computing and consumer electronics equipment failed when the technology industries
refused to support it.43 In the wake of this failure, however, both content and
technology industries have supported narrower proposals for government interven-
tion. In the 2005–06 legislative session, Congress is considering a proposal to require
a “broadcast flag” for digital television content, another proposal to create a parallel
regime for digital audio broadcasts, and a third proposal that would mandate watermark-
ing of broadcast content to prevent broadcasts recorded using analog technologies
from being digitized.44 Meanwhile, the FCC is conducting its own audio broadcast
flag rulemaking, and has already issued a rule establishing content protection require-
ments for content distributed via cable.45 The European Commission is also consider-
ing strategies for encouraging the development of trusted systems technologies.46
The question whether the standards underlying all of these initiatives will be
43. See Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.
2002).
44. See Audio Broadcast Flag Licensing Act of 2006, H.R. 4861, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006);
Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4569, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Sen. Gordon
Smith, Digital Content Protection Act of 2006, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (discussion draft),
http://www.eff.org/broadcastflag/dcp_act_2006.pdf.
45. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (FCC), Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of
Inquiry, No. 04-99 (Apr. 15, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-
99A4.pdf; Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices and Compatibility Between Cable Systems
and Consumer Electronics Equipment, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,728 (Nov. 28, 2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts.
15, 76). In 2003, the FCC issued a rule intended to coordinate the development of a broadcast flag for
digital television, but opponents of the regulation convinced a court to strike down the rule on
jurisdictional grounds. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,624 (Dec. 3, 2003); Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 68
Fed. Reg. 67,599 (Dec. 3, 2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 73, 76); Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550
(2003). The legislative proposal now under discussion would cure the jurisdictional defect and reinstate
the FCC’s broadcast flag rule.
46. See HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MGMT., FINAL REPORT (2004), http://europa.eu.int/
information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/digital_rights_man/doc/040709_hlg_drm_2nd_meeting_
final_report.pdf.
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open or proprietary also remains unanswered. In the U.S., the major entertain-
ment and technology companies have almost uniformly supported proprietary
standards. In Europe, in contrast, an inter-industry working group has recom-
mended that the government encourage the development of open standards for
content protection.47 There appear to be two reasons for this transatlantic
divergence. First, the working group convened by the European Commission to
study content protection issues included not only representatives of the content
industries, but also public broadcasters and consumer groups. Second, the
European technology companies were still smarting over their exclusion from
U.S.-Japanese joint ventures such as the TCG and the 5C alliance.
Exclusive focus on the question of technology mandates, however, ignores
the extent to which trusted systems initiatives continue to move forward via
private standards processes. In particular, the demand for trusted systems
functionality leverages a more general and growing popular and commercial
demand for security against viruses, spyware, and spam.48 As Jonathan Zittrain
describes, the demand for security in online transactions is catalyzing a wide
variety of design efforts aimed at making the ends of the network more
amenable to control.49 While the marketplace response to surface-level techno-
logical protection has been equivocal, demand for robust protection against
malware is strong. Many innovations directed principally at security concerns
can be adapted for copyright enforcement purposes, and many innovations
directed principally at copyright enforcement can be described as targeting
generalizable “security” concerns. One example of a multipurpose “security”
technology is the newest version of the Internet Protocol, IPv6, which includes
a so-called “stateful” mode that facilitates persistent identification of Internet
users.50 This technology was designed to enable secure transactions, and it can
be adapted for copyright enforcement purposes as well.
D. PRESSURE ON NETWORK GATEKEEPERS
The fourth set of strategies for pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
targets third-party providers of network services, such as ISPs and search
engines, that play a vital role in the distribution of online communication,
including both protected and unprotected content. ISPs serve as gatekeepers for
47. See id. at 13.
48. It also leverages a demand for traceability in the interest of “homeland security,” but here the
overlap is more complicated. Some aspects of this overlap are considered in Part III, infra.
49. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006).
50. See Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 3041, Privacy Extensions for Stateless Autoconfigura-
tion in IPv6, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3041.txt?number3041. The Internet Engineering Task Force
recommends implementation of IPv6 in a way that allows individual users to decide whether to enable
or disable this mode, but it cannot require this. See id.; see also Peter Sevcik, Who Will Control
Tomorrow’s Internet?, BUS. COMM. REV., Sept. 1, 2003, at 8 (describing projects under way at
Microsoft, Sony, and Panasonic to build permanent addressing capability into their products). In any
event, a content provider can require that the stateful mode be enabled before it transfers digital
content.
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most online conduct by users, while search engines play an analogous gatekeep-
ing role in the processes of online search and retrieval. In 1998, as part of the
DMCA, the U.S. copyright industries won passage of legislation establishing a
“notice and takedown” procedure under which both types of service providers
may maintain immunity from monetary liability by promptly removing material
called to their attention by copyright owners.51 Like the other provisions of the
DMCA, this provision too has served as a model for legislation in other
countries. Formally, compliance with the notice and takedown procedure is
optional. Because the notice of infringement also creates the factual predicate
for contributory infringement liability, however, service providers have a press-
ing incentive to comply despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that the legal
predicate for the contributory liability of online service providers still has not
been definitively established by any court.52 A recent quantitative study of
takedown notices served on online service providers found that over thirty
percent presented questionable claims of infringement and that many more were
technically flawed.53
Nonprofit educational institutions that function as ISPs for their students and
staff have posed especially difficult problems for the strategy of recruiting
gatekeepers as copyright enforcers. When the copyright and Internet service
industries negotiated the compromise that become the notice and takedown
regime, these institutions, which have considerable political power of their own,
sought and won additional special protections. Most significantly, actions of
users at nonprofit educational institutions may not be attributed to the institution
unless it is on notice of a pattern of infringing conduct. The content industries
have stepped up efforts to provide such notice. They also have sent letters to the
presidents of U.S. colleges and universities requesting that they monitor student
Internet accounts to detect peer-to-peer file trading activities, and have provided
universities with automated tools for processing takedown notices and disabling
student access to peer-to-peer networks.54 Some universities have resisted these
overtures, but some have accepted them.
The DMCA’s notice and takedown provisions do not apply to service provid-
ers based outside the U.S., nor do they apply to entities that merely serve as
passive conduits for Internet traffic routed from non-U.S. locations. Nonethe-
51. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 502, 112 Stat. 2860, 2905–16 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)).
52. For an illuminating discussion of service provider incentives to police online copyright infringe-
ment, see Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2002).
53. Jennifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?: Takedown Notices
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 621 (2006).
54. See Am. Council on Educ., Higher Education Associations and the Creative Content Community
Letters on P2P Piracy, ACENET, Oct. 8, 2002, http://192.111.222.22/washington/letters/2002/10october/
copyright.cfm; Stefanie Olsen, Hollywood’s New Lesson for Campus File Swappers, CNET NEWS.COM,
Apr. 19, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5194341.html (describing implementation of protec-
tive policies at U.C.L.A. and the University of Florida).
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less, the statute contains a separate, little-discussed provision authorizing injunc-
tive relief against a service provider to block access to a specific location
outside the U.S.55 In at least one case, the entertainment industries have
successfully invoked this provision to encourage “conduit” service providers to
close national borders to allegedly infringing traffic. In 2002, the recording
industry sued to require providers of Internet backbone service to block access
to Listen4Ever, a China-based web site offering copyrighted music files for
download. The Listen4Ever site “disappeared” shortly thereafter, and the indus-
try dismissed the suit.56
E. END-USER INITIATIVES
The fifth set of strategies for pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
consists of efforts directed at changing end-user behavior. The recording and
motion picture industries have mounted a concerted campaign to convince
individual users that unauthorized use of their copyrighted content is too risky.
Following a template established by the software industry for corporate users,
the recording industry briefly experimented with an amnesty program designed
to encourage users to “come clean” and pledge to change their ways. Few users
took advantage of this program, however, and a consumer group filed a lawsuit
alleging that elements of it were deceptive, so the industry abandoned it.57 Since
then, the two industries have employed more draconian tactics.
The principal element in the entertainment industries’ enforcement campaign
against individual end users consists of highly publicized waves of civil law-
suits. The Recording Industry Association of America and the Motion Picture
Association of America have filed thousands of so-called “John Doe” lawsuits
against anonymous file traders.58 This procedural tactic enables them to request
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
56. See Kate Bulkley, New Media: Fair Play or Foul?, THE GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 26, 2002, at
20; Alex Pham, Tactics Toughen on Music Piracy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, at C1; see also Daniel W.
Kopko, Looking for a Crack to Break the Internet’s Back: The Listen4ever Case and Backbone
Provider Liability Under the Copyright Act and the DMCA, 8 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 83, 84 (2003).
57. See Matt Hines, RIAA Drops Amnesty Program, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 20, 2004, http://
news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5195301.html.
58. See, e.g., Katie Dean, RIAA Strikes Again at Traders, WIRED.COM, Jan. 22, 2004, http://
www.wired.com/news/digiwood/1,61989-0.html (describing 532 newly filed lawsuits); Jen McCaffery,
Virginia Tech Computer User Is Sued By Recording Industry, ROANOKE TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A1
(describing 477 newly filed lawsuits); Nick Timiraos, Three Students Sued By RIAA, THE HOYA, Mar.
26, 2004, available at http://www.thehoya.com/news/032604/news1.cfm (describing 532 newly filed
lawsuits). For a collection of the pleadings and orders in many of these cases, see http://www.eff.org/IP/
P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php.
The same section of the DMCA that includes the notice and takedown procedure also includes a
subpoena provision designed to allow copyright owners to discover the identities of account holders
who have posted infringing content on the service provider’s servers, again without judicial oversight.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000). For reasons of statutory structure and legislative history, courts have
ruled that copyright owners may not rely on this provision to discover the identities of account holders
for whom the online service provider functions as a passive conduit. See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.,
Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 772 (8th Cir. 2005); RIAA v. Verizon Internet Servs.,
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judicially-supervised subpoenas directed to the online service providers whose
services were used to access the Internet; the service providers must then
identify the subscribers to whom particular Internet Protocol addresses were
assigned at the specified times. Both because individual defendants generally do
not have deep pockets and because lengthy litigation against individuals might
provoke a public backlash, the industries’ preference is not to try these cases.
Instead, they funnel complaints against identified users to a private settlement
service center that offers them a choice between a confidential, relatively small
monetary settlement and public financial ruin.59 Most defendants quickly settle
for an amount reported to be in the $3,000–$6,000 range.60 Because these
lawsuits typically have low filing and overhead costs, the civil settlement
program has become a profit center for the industry.
Lest individuals become too blase´ about the prospect of a several thousand
dollar civil settlement, the civil suits are interspersed with the occasional
criminal prosecution. Some prosecutions have understandable targets. For ex-
ample, the U.S. Department of Justice has prosecuted several individuals who
operated web sites that offered pre-release movies for download to users of the
popular BitTorrent file-sharing application.61 Other targets, however, appear
more randomly selected. In 2005, the recording industry convinced Arizona
state authorities to prosecute an undergraduate at the University of Arizona
under a state “Internet piracy” law. His conviction and sentence to a jail term
followed by community service made the national wire services, and presum-
ably came to the attention of college students across the country.62
The entertainment industries also continue to experiment with attempts to
interfere directly with the exchange of unprotected files by individuals on p2p
networks. Technically, it is possible to use p2p networks to deliver a version of
vigilante justice: “logic bombs” designed to identify and destroy unauthorized
files residing on users’ computers. As currently worded, however, the federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act prohibits this conduct.63 The copyright indus-
Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004). Because courts have
routinely granted “John Doe” subpoena requests, the entertainment industries have not pushed Con-
gress to rewrite § 512(h).
59. See Nick Mamatas, Meet John Doe: The RIAA Runs Its Lawsuits as a Volume Business, and
Sometimes Downloaders Just Gotta Settle, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.villagevoice.com/
music/0510,mamatas,61813,22.html; Andrew Tran, Woman Silenced by Music Mafia, DAILY TEXAN
(Austin), Feb. 4, 2005, available at http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2005/02/04/ (follow “Woman
Silenced by Music Mafia” hyperlink).
60. See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-
Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 749 (2005). Defendants who choose trial
have fared poorly. See BMG Music v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
defendant’s fair use arguments and remanding for determination of statutory damages).
61. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Law Enforcement Announces Operation
D-Elite, Crackdown on P2P Piracy Network (May 25, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/May/
05_crm_291.htm.
62. See Beth DeFalco, Teen Convicted Under Internet Piracy Law, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2005-03-07-az-teen-downloader-convicted_x.htm.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 2002).
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tries have intermittently supported legislation to create an exemption that would
allow them to take the enforcement actions they desire.64 Absent such authority,
they have turned to a more benign strategy known as “spoofing”—flooding p2p
networks with “decoy” files that purport to contain popular audio or video
content, but that when opened contain only noise, or even warnings against
copyright infringement.65 By this campaign and their other user-directed initia-
tives, the entertainment industries hope to propagate a belief that p2p networks
are unreliable as well as dangerous.
F. RHETORICAL POSITIONING
The sixth and final set of strategies for pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement operates entirely on the rhetorical level, and seeks to mold public
awareness of copyright issues. Entertainment industry representatives have
deployed a variety of rhetorical tropes designed to position online copyright
infringement, and particularly p2p filesharing, as morally objectionable and
socially insidious. In a blizzard of press releases and media interviews, and in a
variety of more formal settings ranging from conference addresses to congres-
sional testimony, they have equated online copyright infringement with theft,
piracy, communism, plague, pandemic, and terrorism.66 In an effort both to
boost demand for trusted systems functionality and shore up support for govern-
ment-imposed technology mandates, they have also linked p2p filesharing with
the spread of pornography and with increased risk of exposure to viruses and
spyware.67
These rhetorical initiatives have not gone uncontested. However, legal schol-
ars and public domain advocates have tended to focus on the “theft,” “piracy,”
and “communism” strands, all of which hinge on presuppositions about the
extent to which copyright is really “property,” and to ignore or ridicule the
other, more hyperbolic comparisons. As I will show, the rhetoric of disease and
64. See H.R. 5211, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002); Ted Bridis & Lee Davidson, Download at Your
Own Risk, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), June 18, 2003, at A01 (describing statements by
Sen. Orrin Hatch supporting such an approach).
65. See Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 311–13 (2005); Jay Lyman,
P2Ps Turn Tables on RIAA, Allege Patent Infringement, TECHNEWSWORLD.COM, Sept. 10, 2004, http://
www.technewsworld.com/story/entertainment/p2p-kazaa-altnet-riaa-36520.html.
66. See GILLESPIE, supra note 4, ch. 4; Alex Cameron, Diagnosis Technoplague: Tracing Metaphors
and Their Implications in Digital Copyright (working paper on file with author); John Logie, A
Copyright Cold War? The Polarized Rhetoric of the Peer-to-Peer Debates, FIRST MONDAY, July 2003,
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue8_7/logie/index.html.
67. See Content Protection in the Digital Age: The Broadcasting Flag, High-Definition Radio, and
the Analog Hole: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) (statement of Mitch Bainwol, CEO, Recording
Industry Association of America); Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Ali Aydar, COO,
SNOCAP); Reducing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Piracy on University Campuses: A Progress Update: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 38 (2005) (statement of Richard Taylor, Senior Vice President, Motion Picture
Association of America).
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terror—of crisis—plays a critical role in undergirding the other strategies. For
this reason, it holds an important key to understanding the emerging phenom-
enon of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement as a whole.
II. NORMAL DISCIPLINE IN THE AGE OF CRISIS
Theorizing the drive toward pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
has posed challenges for scholars accustomed to analyzing information markets
within the framework of intellectual property law. For some intellectual prop-
erty scholars, the strategies described above are simply logical responses to the
economics of large-scale infringement in a networked information environ-
ment.68 For others, they signal an efficient shift toward reliance on self-help to
protect legal entitlements.69 But the changes that these strategies portend for the
networked information environment go far beyond allocative efficiency. Perva-
sively distributed copyright enforcement signals systemic changes in the order-
ing of vast sectors of activity both inside and outside markets, in response to
asserted needs that are both economic and societal. Understanding these changes
requires a broader range of tools than economically-inclined theorists of intellec-
tual property rights ordinarily employ. Within social theory, important tools for
theorizing the progressive deployment of pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement are found in Michel Foucault’s work on systems of social disci-
pline.70 On the whole, intellectual property scholars have read this work too
narrowly, and consequently have overlooked some aspects of it that are espe-
cially relevant to understanding what the shift to pervasively distributed copy-
right enforcement represents.
Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement is not intended to eliminate
transactions between information providers and information users, but it is
intended to change the technical and legal parameters of those transactions in a
way that renders them fundamentally relational on two levels. For end users,
information transactions will become processes characterized by the ongoing
authorization of access and use. For technology providers, transactions over
technical standards will undergo a similar transformation. Relationships be-
tween information providers and information users will be mediated partly by
68. See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217;
Hughes, supra note 60; Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringe-
ment Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004); Randal C. Picker, The Digital
Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205 (2004); see also Douglas
Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective,
16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 396 (2003) (observing that imposing liability on parties that are in a
position to control infringement is efficient, but noting that other policy considerations might weigh
against some extensions of indirect liability).
69. See, e.g., Douglas G. Lichtman, Defusing DRM 9 (Univ. of Chi. Law School, John M. Olin Law
& Econ. Working Paper No. 282, 2006).
70. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–
1977 (1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH].
2006] 19PERVASIVELY DISTRIBUTED COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT
technical standards, and so pervasively distributed copyright enforcement seeks
to change the ways in which these standards are developed and implemented.
Usually, participation in both standards and standards development processes is
determined by economic self-interest. But pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement will not work properly unless compliance by licensed equipment
and service providers is mandatory and verifiable. Effective implementation of
pervasively distributed copyright enforcement therefore requires ongoing autho-
rization of access to and implementation of the relevant standards.71 To under-
stand these linked regimes of ongoing authorization as a social and historical
phenomenon, intellectual property scholars must look beyond literatures about
markets and standards.
Alfred Yen has suggested that the emerging web of relationships between
individuals and Internet access providers resembles a quasi-feudal regime of
distributed governance.72 Although “the Internet” as a whole cannot easily be
controlled or governed, gateways to the network have virtually unlimited
powers to control the parameters of access. Within this system, as in medieval
systems of vassalage, “[s]tate power becomes an incident of private property
that gets fragmented through delegation to numerous private parties.”73 Al-
though in theory (and in extremis) an Internet access provider is subject to the
full extent of state authority, Yen argues that as a practical matter its authority
over the day-to-day operation of its fiefdom is absolute. The comparison is an
original and thought-provoking one, and it is worth considering whether it
might also supply a useful way of understanding the rise of copyright enforce-
ment and surveillance regimes.
The metaphor of the feudal fiefdom, however, seems imperfectly suited to
describe the linked practices of control and ongoing authorization that character-
ize pervasively distributed copyright enforcement. Feudalism responded to the
ungovernability of large medieval realms by partitioning geographic space into
smaller and smaller parcels; likewise, the sovereignty of Internet access provid-
ers derives from their absolute authority to control traffic through and content
hosted on their servers. Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement instead
enables governability from afar. By insinuating automated control into formerly
private spaces and activities, these technologies can obviate much of the need
for localized enforcement. Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement also
enables the coordination of regulation and enforcement by multiple right-
71. As Tarleton Gillespie explains, this is perhaps the most significant difference between the music
industry’s failed Secure Digital Music Initiative and the movie industry’s successful DVD-CCA
initiative. See GILLESPIE, supra note 4, chs. 5–6.
72. Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207 (2002); see also Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the
Design of the Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANS. INTERNET
TECH. 70, 71 (2001) (arguing that assertions of control by Internet access providers threaten the
“end-to-end” principle that originally informed the design of Internet protocols).
73. Yen, supra note 72, at 1240.
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holders, reflecting the fact that individuals may enter into a multiplicity of
relationships with information providers. The disparities of power within a fully
implemented set of controls are distributed and systemic; they form a network
of coordinated actors, not a rigidly ordered feudal hierarchy.
Unlike the quasi-feudal regime that mediates Internet access, the emergent
system of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement does not embody
notions of sovereignty in the conventional (territorial, top-down) sense; instead,
it infuses regulation into the artifacts and practices of daily life. The application
of technology to propagate regulatory features throughout digital spaces in turn
produces particular (new) configurations of those spaces, which embody new
arrangements of power, and instill new expectations of conduct. To say that
these developments exemplify “regulation by code” is to confuse description
with explanation.74 Understanding these developments requires a theory that
encompasses the modalities of regulation by pervasive, embedded social institu-
tions.
In search of a social theory of technology-based regulation, some cyberlaw
scholars have turned to Michel Foucault’s work on the Panopticon. Devised by
Jeremy Bentham, the Panopticon consisted of a central guard tower surrounded
by concentric rings of cells arranged in such a fashion that the guard could see
into any of them at will, but could not himself be seen. In his survey of the
history of disciplinary systems, Foucault characterized the Panopticon as the
perfect prison, observing that it ensured both the complete visibility of those to
be surveilled and the complete invisibility of the watchers. To borrow a phrase
from Jamie Boyle, for cyberlaw scholars this analogy has proved “too succulent
to resist.”75 Panoptic theories of the information age abound. In particular,
privacy scholars have invoked panoptic imagery and Foucault’s discussion of
Bentham to criticize the use of networked digital technologies for surveillance
and profiling purposes.76 Translating this approach to the copyright context has
74. The conventional reference is to Lessig and Reidenberg, although neither advances so simplistic
a theory. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (advancing a positive
theory about code as a modality of regulation and a normative theory about correspondence between
digital architectures and the freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553
(1998) (advancing a positive theory about code as a modality of regulation and a normative theory
about appropriate uses of this modality by the state); see also WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE,
PLACE, AND THE INFOBAHN 111–12 (1995). In fact, the central insight has a much longer pedigree. See,
e.g., SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (Wiebe E. Bijker &
John Law eds., 1992); LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A
THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 323 (1977).
75. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 n.12 (2003).
76. See, e.g., OSCAR GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
(1993); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 213–14 (2000);
Stan Karas, Enhancing the Privacy Discourse: Consumer Information Gathering as Surveillance, 7 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 30 (2002); Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 393 (2002);
Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 852–54 (2000); Shaun B.
Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 864–66
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proved difficult, however. The strategies of pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement are not all surveillance-based. The emphasis on surveillance leads
scholars to focus on some strategies while ignoring others, and paying insuffi-
cient attention to the cumulative effect of all of them.77
This form of panoptic reasoning about the networked information age strikes
some critics as a fantastic excursion into the realm of conspiracy theory. To
some extent this resistance results from the implicit conflation of panoptic
discipline with surveillance, but it also rests on an equation of panopticism with
centralization. For scholars who make these assumptions, panoptic theories do
not satisfactorily explain how the fundamentally centralized model of discipline
embodied in the Panopticon translates to contexts in which neither surveillance
nor control is centralized. For this reason, they conclude that while the Panopti-
con was an interesting and memorably named conceptual experiment, taken on
its own terms it does not furnish a compelling model for many extensions of
power in market-democratic societies.
As I will explain, the standard invocation of panopticism on all sides of this
debate rests on an overliteral interpretation of what Foucault was about.78
Nonetheless, there are important differences between pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement and each of two distinct disciplinary models that Fou-
cault articulated. Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement is a disciplinary
hybrid, with features that merit exceptionally close consideration. Unlike either
of Foucault’s two real-world models, moreover, pervasively distributed copy-
right enforcement is panoptic discipline in exactly the Foucauldian sense.
Foucault elaborated two models of social discipline, which I will call “normal
discipline” and “crisis discipline.” Normal discipline encompasses the processes
by which power diffuses throughout ordinary institutions and is coordinated by
the everyday routines and interactions of a variety of public and private actors.
Its most visible components are institutions that target marginal, abnormal, or
imperfect members of society for treatment, education, socialization, or punish-
ment. Foucault painstakingly documented and analyzed the emergence of hospi-
tals, schools, armies, and prisons as institutions for social discipline.79 The
techniques employed consisted of the simultaneous gathering of information by
surveillance and repeated examination (the observation of prisoners but also the
division of schoolchildren and soldiers into ranks and the singling out of poor
performers). Surveillance was enabled by partitioning geographic space—
(2002); see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1413–18 (2001) (exploring the limits of the panoptic
metaphor).
77. See Katyal, supra note 65; Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297
(2004).
78. The exception is James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-
wired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997). Boyle persuasively refutes the notion that panoptic
discipline requires the exercise of top-down sovereignty in the conventional sense. He does not address
the implicit linkage of panoptic discipline with surveillance to the exclusion of other techniques.
79. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 70, at 135–94, 231–56.
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prisoners in their cells, mental patients in their wards, soldiers in their ranks,
and schoolchildren in their classes. One of Foucault’s central insights was that
these ostensibly marginal institutions also discipline those not subject to their
control, albeit indirectly.80 Schools, hospitals, armies, and prisons normalize by
exclusion; by defining, excluding, and disciplining those deemed abnormal or
transitional, they simultaneously define and enforce the parameters of normalcy
for everyone else.
Foucault proffered the Panopticon not as a blueprint for a particular disciplin-
ary institution but rather as an organizing metaphor for this emergent class of
“normal” disciplinary strategies, which harnessed space and visibility “to im-
prove the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a
design of subtle coercion for a society to come.”81 Panoptic discipline in this
metaphoric sense is not simply a function of surveillance, but also depends
partly and importantly on two other factors. First, it entails an arrangement of
social space that obviates the need for continual surveillance. The Panopticon
was perfect in this regard because its architecture ensured continual exposure.
Second and relatedly, this arrangement fosters the widespread internalization of
disciplinary norms. Judged against these criteria, the institutions of normal
discipline, which single out particular populations, are imperfectly coercive of
the “normal” population and therefore are imperfect realizations of the idealized
panoptic model.
Crisis discipline, in contrast, refers to regimes developed in response to
extreme circumstances that were perceived to threaten the community’s very
survival. Unlike the visible mechanisms of normal discipline, those developed
for crisis discipline were universally applicable. In particular, Foucault focused
on the methods developed by medieval city-states for managing outbreaks of
the plague.82 Here too, the principal tool of discipline was geographic. Although
medieval physicians did not have the benefit of modern principles of microbiol-
ogy and epidemiology, they understood that the plague spread by human-to-
human contact. Therefore, during an outbreak, citizens were forbidden to leave
their homes. Every evening, a designated corps of inspectors would go door-to-
door and demand that each inhabitant of a household stand at the window to
prove that he or she was still alive. If the inhabitants of a home were stricken,
the home remained isolated until everyone in it had either died or shown
immunity by surviving. Then, the home was scoured and its contents burned.
Considered in light of this taxonomy, many of the strategies described in Part
80. See id. at 210–28.
81. Id. at 209; see also id. at 205 (“[T]he Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it
is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any
obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in
fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use.”); Boyle,
supra note 78, at 185–88 (identifying the Panopticon as the “paradigm” for a model of disciplinary
power).
82. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 70, at 195–98.
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I do not conform to the “panoptic” model of invisible, internalized discipline,
but rather seem intended to instantiate crisis discipline. The rhetorical strategies,
the pressures brought to bear on independent equipment providers and network
gatekeepers, and the litigation campaign against users all are designed to signal
a state of emergency. In particular, the more extreme rhetorical tropes are
intended to establish that uncontrolled networked communication can spread
contagion. In his decision in the DeCSS litigation, Judge Lewis Kaplan ex-
plained:
In a common source epidemic, as where members of a population contract
a non-contagious disease from a poisoned well, the disease spreads only by
exposure to the common source. If one eliminates the source, or closes the
contaminated well, the epidemic is stopped. In a propagated outbreak epi-
demic, on the other hand, the disease spreads from person to person. Hence,
finding the initial source of the infection accomplishes little, as the disease
continues to spread even if the initial source is eliminated. For obvious
reasons, then, propagated outbreak epidemics, all other things beings equal,
can be far more difficult to control.
This disease metaphor is helpful here. The book infringement hypothetical
is analogous to a common source outbreak epidemic. Shut down the printing
press (poisoned well) and one ends the infringement (the disease outbreak).
The spread of means of circumventing access to copyrighted works in digital
form, however, is analogous to a propagated outbreak epidemic. Finding the
original source of infection (e.g., the author of DeCSS[, the computer pro-
gram that decrypts the content on DVDs,] or the person to misuse it)
accomplishes nothing as the disease (infringement made possible by DeCSS,
the resulting availability of decrypted DVDs) may continue to spread from
one person who gains access to the circumvention program or decrypted DVD
to another. And each is “infected,” i.e., each is as capable of making perfect
copies of the digital file containing the copyrighted work as the author of the
program or the first person to use it for improper purposes.83
Judge Kaplan’s elaboration of the disease metaphor for online copyright infringe-
ment is not a solitary instance of hyperbole, but rather adopts a persistent theme
sounded by the copyright industries and echoed in media coverage of digital
copyright issues.84
83. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d
sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
84. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Holds Hearing on Evaluating Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Piracy, in FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, June 9, 2004 (statement of Jack
Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America), available at 2004 WL
1294332; Suzanne Choney, Piracy Keeps Online Music From Singing a Happy Tune, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., May 3, 2004, at C1; James Flanigan, Asset-Heavy Companies Need to Slim Down, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2003, at C1; Strategies to Sink the Music Pirates, THE AUSTRALIAN, July 18, 2003, at 10; Tom
Zucco, Unchained Melodies, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at D1; Cameron, supra note 66
(collecting uses of the plague metaphor); Olga Kharif, Facing the Digital Music at Record Shops,
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Extraordinary threats demand extraordinary countermeasures. If online copy-
right infringement is the plague, and direct, unmediated human-to-human com-
munication is its medium of transmission, then we might expect proposals for
extreme restrictions on communication to follow. As Foucault explains, one
responds to a great threat that travels by human contact in the only way
possible—by eliminating contact:
[A]gainst an extraordinary evil, power is mobilized; it makes itself every-
where present and visible; it invents new mechanisms; it separates, it immobi-
lizes, it partitions; it constructs for a time what is both a counter-city and the
perfect society; it imposes an ideal functioning, but one that is reduced, in the
final analysis, like the evil that it combats, to a simple dualism of life and
death: that which moves brings death, and one kills that which moves.85
The phenomenon of online copyright infringement differs from a microbial
epidemic in one important way that affects the selection of countermeasures.
The germs that cause bubonic plague have no positive qualities, and there is no
independent reason to disseminate them. Copyrighted content, in contrast, must
be disseminated broadly in order for its producers to earn a profit. The deadly
vector is not the protected work, but the unprotected work. The “propagated
outbreak epidemic” to which Judge Kaplan referred is simply an example of a
more general property of networks of all sorts;86 the content industries are not
averse to harnessing the considerable benefits of network distribution for their
own purposes. An effective disciplinary regime therefore must concentrate on
preventing users from converting protected to unprotected content.
The strategies for control described above are intended to accomplish pre-
cisely this separation of protected from unprotected content. The techniques of
ongoing authorization, automated enforcement, and widely distributed policing
obligations adapt the philosophy and instrumentalities of plague control to the
digital age. More precise control of interactions with information goods obvi-
ates the need for physical confinement of persons, while direct functionality
restrictions and trusted systems protocols serve to ensure that protected informa-
tion carries the terms of its confinement with it.
Upon closer consideration, however, pervasively distributed copyright enforce-
ment does not precisely fit the crisis discipline model, either. Crisis discipline is
temporary and highly visible, while pervasively distributed copyright enforce-
ment is intended to be permanent, and to become gradually more invisible as
patterns of user behavior evolve. If the technology-based strategies described in
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June 21, 2001, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2001/
tc20010621_232.htm; Richard Shim, News Corp. Exec Puts Piracy in the Spotlight, CNET NEWS.COM,
Nov. 19, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1040-966457.html.
85. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 70, at 205.
86. For a concise, highly readable explanation, see ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW
SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 123–42 (2002).
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Part I work as intended, the underlying regime of protocols, authorizations, and
other gatekeeping mechanisms will simply fade into the background. This raises
the question whether the current struggles simply mark a moment of transition
to a new regime of normal discipline. In the longer term, perhaps it is a mistake
to regard the shift to pervasively distributed copyright enforcement as anything
more than a shift in norms. Yet the emergent model of pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement has important features that the regimes of normal disci-
pline outlined by Foucault did not. The shift to pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement signals the emergence of an anomalous, hybrid form of discipline
predicated on permanent crisis.
Consider again the distinctive attributes of each mode of discipline that Foucault
described: Crisis discipline is centralized, universal, and highly visible, but temporary.
Normal discipline is the polar opposite: It is decentralized, differential, and largely
invisible, but permanent. Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement does not align
perfectly with either model. Like crisis discipline, it is (or aspires to be) universally
restrictive; like normal discipline, it is intended to be permanent. Its constituent
strategies are not centralized and visible, but neither are they wholly decentralized and
wholly invisible. Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement is a mode of manag-
ing an ongoing crisis that cannot be completely resolved. Crisis management consists
in the establishment and normalization of coordinated patterns of authorization and
constraint.
Let us begin with permanency. Foucault’s model of crisis discipline does not
encompass conditions of permanent emergency. In the societies that originated the
techniques of plague control, emergencies were temporary. As the plague passed, so
did the ability to sustain the extreme measures it was thought to justify. Medieval
burghers were not placed under house arrest indefinitely, but only until the plague had
been isolated and purged from each place it had touched. The implicit definition of
acute danger as episodic does not translate well to the context of online copyright
infringement. Here again, Judge Kaplan’s reasoning is illustrative:
The disease metaphor breaks down principally at the final point. Individuals
infected with a real disease become sick, usually are driven by obvious
self-interest to seek medical attention, and are cured of the disease if medical
science is capable of doing so. Individuals infected with the “disease” of
capability of circumventing measures controlling access to copyrighted works
in digital form, however, do not suffer from having that ability. They cannot
be relied upon to identify themselves to those seeking to control the “disease.”
And their self-interest will motivate some to misuse the capability, a misuse
that, in practical terms, often will be untraceable.87
What happens to disciplinary modalities when crisis is not temporary, but a
permanent state of affairs? As Foucault’s work on normal discipline suggests, a
87. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
26 [Vol. 95:1THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
hallmark of (modern) times of relative normalcy is that more subtle, less direct
modes of discipline come to the fore. The institutions of normal discipline take
the form of “a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power
relations in terms of the everyday life of men.”88 These disciplinary methods
work, in other words, because citizens of a society internalize the criteria that
they apply. Normal discipline labels and smooths away quotidian challenges to
the fabric of social life. We carry our conditioning, and our blinders, with us.
If the sense of continuing crisis articulated by Judge Kaplan is sufficiently
widespread—and the rhetorical strategies of pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement are crafted to convince us that it is—then, using Foucault’s observa-
tions as a guide, we might expect to see a hybrid form of discipline coming into
existence. This hybrid regime would require a generalizable model of function-
ing, sustainable on a day to day basis. The model would condition both by
direct behavioral restrictions and by the more subtle mechanisms of normaliza-
tion. It would also retain the capability to respond with appropriate severity to
the conditions that brought about the crisis in the first place. Pervasively
distributed copyright enforcement meets all of these requirements. It is predi-
cated on technical and legal strategies for separating protected from unprotected
content—for operationalizing plague control—but also and importantly for
normalizing the processes and technologies that accomplish the separation.
Fundamental to pervasively distributed copyright enforcement is the capacity to
“kill that which moves” on the justification that the state of emergency is always
with us.
A hybrid disciplinary model need not entail theoretical or practical inconsisten-
cies. The crisis discipline of plague control was not sustainable for long periods
of time because of the massive expenditure of resources it entailed and the
near-complete suspension of ordinary activity that it required. It does not
follow, however, that all methods of crisis control are equally maladapted for
long-term use. Here it is useful to reconsider the prison (in its real-world form,
not the idealized Panopticon) as a model for both perpetuation and containment
of a form of crisis discipline within the larger social framework. Societies
isolate prisoners to avert crisis, and the enterprise of prison-maintenance need
not entail a total breakdown of “normal” social functioning; indeed, Foucault’s
account suggests that prisons serve partly to enable such functioning. Prisons
operate by geographic containment of people, but the point is a more general
one: Normal discipline and crisis discipline are not mutually exclusive chrono-
logic states, and their boundaries will constantly be subject to (re)negotiation.89
88. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 70, at 205.
89. For perceptive discussions of this problem in the more traditional context of threats to national
and domestic security, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004);
Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011 (2003). Gross, in particular, argues that the assumption of temporal and geographic separation
between normal and crisis conditions is fatally undermined by the realities of modern geopolitics, and
that “[w]ithout separation, it is but a short step to conflate emergency powers and norms with the
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The example of the prison, though, raises interlinked questions of universal-
ity and legitimacy. Prisons undergird a regime of normal discipline that weighs
least heavily on the normal; that is both its point and its method. Pervasively
distributed copyright enforcement does not fit this pattern. Its most severe
restrictions are designed to bind everyone, and indeed could not be imple-
mented differentially. In this respect they are more like plague control measures,
but plague control was temporary. The shift to pervasively distributed copyright
enforcement thus holds the potential to accomplish a breathtakingly inclusive
extension of control, of the type that Foucault’s medieval rulers might have
wished, but did not dare, to put in place. Whether this is feasible depends in part
on public perceptions of the conditions asserted to constitute a crisis; the
rhetorical strategies of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement are di-
rected principally toward this end. But Foucault’s work on normal discipline
should remind us that the success of a permanent disciplinary regime does not
depend on its ability to foster constant awareness of danger. The legitimacy of
permanent, universal restrictions depends importantly on their perceived obtru-
siveness. Normal discipline succeeds most completely when we stop noticing
that it is there.
A hallmark of normal discipline is the seamless integration of disciplinary
mechanisms within the fabric of everyday life, and so pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement aims for just this sort of seamless integration. Each of
the six strategies is a means of instilling in consumers and technology providers
an unquestioning acceptance of both the particular boundaries, and a particular
overarching conception of boundedness, that content owners want. Yet perva-
sively distributed copyright enforcement does not seek to instill acceptance by
the “normal” population principally through the articulation and internalization
of norms. Containing crisis also entails establishing technical and market
path-dependencies that themselves come to be seen as normal and natural. The
strategies of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement redraw the bound-
aries of private discretion to determine the rules of interaction with content.
Rather than normalizing those who remain on the “right” side of the new
boundaries, it seeks to normalize a regime of universal, technologically-encoded
constraint.
The resulting regime of crisis management is neither wholly centralized nor
wholly decentralized; it relies, instead, on coordination of technologies and
processes for authorizing information flows. Alexander Galloway has argued
that the constraint effectuated by technical protocols is not a continuation of
“discipline” in the sense described by Foucault but a new mode of social
‘ordinary’ and the ‘normal.’” Gross, supra, at 1069–96. Ackerman concurs, but believes that the extent
to which crisis mentality becomes normalized will depend substantially on how “emergency” is
understood. Ackerman, supra, at 1039–45. As the remainder of this essay will suggest, I believe both
are right.
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ordering in its own right.90 At least as applied to pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement, however, that argument reifies the technical at the
expense of the social. Particular forms of protocol do not evolve by happen-
stance, and the ways in which they evolve are important to understanding the
social orderings that they support. Protocol does not supersede or substitute for
discipline, but amplifies it.
The hybrid discipline of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement is
panoptic discipline in exactly the Foucauldian sense: It is a coordinated set of
architectural and behavioral constraints the primary function of which is not to
enable surveillance but instead to obviate the need for it. It is intended to
produce internalization of the “correct” rules for interacting with digital content,
but it also is broadly coercive in a way that a primarily norm-based regime is
not. To characterize pervasively distributed copyright enforcement simply as
“the new normal,” as some of its proponents have suggested, is to mistake its
magnitude and fundamentally misapprehend its operation. Evaluating perva-
sively distributed copyright enforcement requires a more careful, critical ap-
proach, and one that considers all of its constituent strategies.
III. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND MARKET ORDERING
For two distinct groups of critics, the rubric of coercion that animates
Foucauldian theory, and that underlies my account of pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement as crisis management, is not a compelling one. Critics in
the first group, whom I will call market libertarians, argue that in a decentral-
ized market economy, whatever modes of social ordering emerge from the
market will be modes that are chosen by market participants, including informa-
tion vendors, technology vendors, and information consumers. Arguably, it is a
mistake to regard discipline imposed in this fashion as anything other than
voluntary, and if it is voluntary it is a waste of time to worry about whether it is
coercive in a more abstract, theoretical sense. Critics in the second group, whom
I will call speech libertarians, agree that the decentralized, loosely coordinated
strategies of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement evidence coercive
intent, but argue that individual liberty will prove impervious to control. In
particular, they point to the continued existence of thriving darknets as evidence
that pervasively distributed copyright enforcement cannot succeed. The speech
libertarian objection is the subject of Part IV; here, I consider the market
libertarian objection. What counts as coercion within social theory and what
counts within legal theory need not be identical. Even so, pervasively distrib-
uted copyright enforcement forces choices that market participants otherwise
might not be inclined to make.
How, exactly, does the emerging phenomenon of pervasively distributed
90. ALEXANDER R. GALLOWAY, PROTOCOL: HOW CONTROL EXISTS AFTER DECENTRALIZATION 20–27
(2004).
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copyright enforcement acquire the authority to subject practices of intellectual
consumption to the instrumentalities of plague control? Like Bentham’s model
of the Panopticon, Foucault’s paradigm case of crisis discipline involved deploy-
ment by a centralized and highly authoritarian government. Under those circum-
stances, the power to implement crisis control measures may safely be presumed.
The technology-based strategies described in Part I are for the most part
deployed and coordinated by a decentralized network of private actors. Still
missing from the account of these initiatives as crisis management is an
explanation of the logic that underlies their privatization and decentralization.
Answering this question requires, first, some consideration of the origins of
power, a problem in which Foucault himself seemed relatively uninterested.91
Although discipline is rooted in power, Foucault was less concerned with
tracing power back to its roots than with mapping its imprint in the processes of
everyday life. The two problems, however, are linked. This is perhaps clearest
in the case of normal discipline. Any modern society will have schools, prisons,
armies, and hospitals, but the methods practiced within these institutions will
vary from society to society based on other institutions and ideologies. The
working out of power through institutional mechanisms proceeds by way of a
complex set of mutually constituting relationships. Yet this proposition also
holds true for mechanisms of crisis discipline. In all but the most authoritarian
societies, disciplinary mechanisms must negotiate interrelated issues of feasibil-
ity and legitimacy. In crisis, this negotiation becomes easier, but not infinitely
so.
Anthony Giddens’s theory of power as structuration is particularly useful for
understanding the elaboration of power within a decentralized network of public
and private actors.92 Giddens substitutes a robust vision of human agency for
the “docile bodies” of Foucauldian social theory; he argues that individuals and
groups are not simply the passive products of larger social forces, but make
self-aware and self-interested decisions. At the same time, the theory’s central
premise is that human interactions are constrained, though not determined, by
the “resources” of each group of actors and by each group’s own habitual, or
“recursive,” practices.93 The tension between self-interested action and the
constraints of authority and practice drives the evolution of human institutions,
which proceeds in pathways that are simultaneously predictable and contingent.
91. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 70, at 104–08; Michel Foucault, Afterword:
The Subject and Power, in HUBERT DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURAL-
ISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 221 (1982).
92. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION
(1984).
93. See id. at 2–28; cf. PIERRE BOURDIEU, PRACTICAL REASON: ON THE THEORY OF ACTION 31–34 (1998)
(characterizing “social space” as the dynamic product of interactions between “agents . . . with differen-
tiated means and ends according to their position in the structure of the field of forces, thus contributing
to conserving or transforming its structure”); PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE
(1977) (developing a theory of social practice as consisting of purposive pursuit of “strategies” rather
than automatic adherence to “rules”).
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Viewed through the lens of structuration theory, the drive toward pervasively
distributed copyright enforcement may be understood as flowing from the
self-interested interactions of a number of relevant groups.
The perceived need to control the threat of online copyright infringement
supplies both information providers and governments with powerful (though
slightly different) motives for the pervasive extension of control. Information
providers seek, first and foremost, to enforce what they perceive as “their”
entitlements. Because intellectual property entitlements are limited rights, this
characterization involves considerable oversimplification and a certain amount
of overreaching. At the same time, though, one must acknowledge this overreach-
ing as an attempt to avert what is perceived, rightly or not, as a catastrophic
threat to business models heavily dependent on the limitations of analog
technologies. This response may be shortsighted, but it is entirely understand-
able. Arguments that the business models now dominant in the content indus-
tries should succumb to a whirlwind of Schumpeterian creative destruction,
while appealing to academic commentators, hold much less appeal for those on
the receiving end of the whirlwind.94 Under the circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing to find information providers resorting to their time-tested repertoire of
recursive practices—licensing, litigation, lobbying, and public relations—to
preserve the market positions to which they have grown accustomed.
Government motives to support the extension of surveillance and control by
private information providers are more complex. Governments are in general
sympathetic to the asserted need to protect private property, both for idealistic
reasons related to notions of the social contract and the rule of law and for less
idealistic reasons related to legislative and regulatory capture and the promotion
of trade-related agendas. Thus one might logically expect to see extensive state
backing of private intellectual property enforcement efforts undertaken by
powerful domestic industries, and in fact this has been the case.
Given this confluence of private and state interests, what is interesting is the
extent to which mechanisms for control and surveillance of information use are
envisioned as operating independently of direct government involvement. The
anti-circumvention and anti-device provisions of the DMCA operate primarily
as a backstop for the direct regulation to be effectuated by “trusted systems”
technologies, and the notice-and-takedown provisions applicable to Internet
service providers deliberately shift government out of the picture.95 The pro-
posed technology mandates described in Part I have been crafted to function
primarily as mechanisms for coordinating industry-driven standards develop-
ment and licensing processes.
Here it is important to understand that the emerging network of private
disciplinary measures serves both private and state interests far better than more
94. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002).
95. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201(a)–(b) (2000).
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extensive official involvement might.96 To the extent that pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement remains primarily a matter of industry initiative, information
providers enjoy virtually complete freedom to define the scope of their entitlements.97
From the perspective of the state, meanwhile, the installation of technologies that
generate detailed records of information use also serves other state interests, including
censorship and the containment of terrorism.98 Precisely for this reason, however,
devolution of enforcement power into private hands is essential. Generally speaking,
in democratic societies, government surveillance initiatives incur far more searching
public scrutiny and meet with far more resistance than analogous private efforts
deployed to enforce private bargains. To take just a few examples, the U.S. govern-
ment’s controversial Total Information Awareness initiative, an attempt to implement
comprehensive “dataveillance” of U.S. citizens, residents, and visitors, quickly be-
came mired in congressional hearings.99 The CAPPS II airline passenger profiling
initiative fared slightly better, in part because it was (or at least appeared to be) more
narrowly targeted, but ultimately succumbed in the face of intense pressure brought to
bear on it by critics and open government watchdogs.100 The next such initiative, the
Secure Flight program, met the same fate.101 The USA PATRIOT Act, which con-
ferred expanded surveillance powers on federal authorities in the wake of the Septem-
ber 11, 2001, terrorist acts, has been mired in controversy since its enactment. Except
among a small group of technological and legal cognoscenti, private-sector trusted
systems initiatives have generated comparatively few ripples of alarm.
Deploying crisis management through the marketplace remains, nonetheless,
a somewhat trickier business than deploying it by state fiat. A satisfactory
96. Cf. Boyle, supra note 78 (arguing that states need not employ conventional, top-down regulation
to gain regulatory leverage).
97. Niva Elkin-Koren has aptly characterized the resulting entitlements as “rights without laws.”
Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155
(1999).
98. See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of
the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003).
99. See Senate Rebuffs Domestic Spy Plan, WIRED.COM, Jan. 23, 2003, http://www.wired.com/news/
politics/0,1283,57386,00.html. For an insightful discussion of the factors that influence both the level of
public outrage and the success of public protests directed at technical developments that threaten
privacy, see LAURA J. GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE: THE ONLINE PROTESTS OVER
LOTUS MARKETPLACE AND THE CLIPPER CHIP (1997).
100. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-385, AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSEN-
GER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES (2004); Sara Kehaulani Goo
& Robert O’Harrow, Jr., New Airline Screening System Postponed; Controversy Over Privacy Leads to
CAPPS II Paring, Delay Until After Election, WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at A2; Jon Marino, Fixes
Promised For Planned Airport Screening System, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A38; Alexandra Marks,
Big Business Joins Fight Against New Airport Screening, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 12, 2004, at 3;
Mary Lou Pickel, TSA Data Assertion Disputed by Delta, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 24, 2004, at 1D.
101. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-374T, AVIATION SECURITY: SIGNIFICANT MANAGE-
MENT CHALLENGES MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRA-
TION’S SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM (2006); SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT
WORKING GROUP (2005), http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/sfwg_report_091905.pdf; Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr., Secure Flight, http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/secureflight.html (last visited May 4,
2006).
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explanation of the logic of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement must
take into account the motives, resources, and recursive practices of several
additional groups of actors.102 Of these, the ultimate users of information goods
are by no means the most important.
The “market for technological protection” is, in the first instance, not the
end-user market for digital content but rather the market of intermediary
licensors, which includes both content distributors and manufacturers of devices
for rendering the content. Within this market, the longer-term goal of perva-
sively distributed copyright enforcement is not so much to eliminate third-party
independents as simply to eliminate their technological independence by recruit-
ing them into the contractual networks that implement surface-level technologi-
cal restrictions and trusted systems protocols. The twin threats of indirect
infringement liability and DMCA liability supply additional incentives to join
these networks. Although users have repeatedly shown that they will reward
entrepreneurs who provide them with freedom and flexibility to use, manipu-
late, copy, and redistribute digital content, the costs of providing freedom have
risen sharply in the wake of the content industries’ highly-publicized legal
victories against MP3.com, Napster, Grokster, SonicBlue, and other innovators.
The costs of raising startup capital have risen commensurately, and may become
prohibitive if the suit against Napster’s backers succeeds. Increasingly, there-
fore, the rational strategy is to license content and build devices subject to
restrictions, regardless of whether the intermediary might otherwise prefer a
different strategy.
Large incumbents in the consumer electronics and personal computing mar-
kets have greater resources and face less extreme risks, and have successfully
resisted some copyright industry initiatives to impose broadly defined mandates
that would disrupt existing markets and distribution systems. They have been
much less inclined to resist the incremental introduction of surface-level restric-
tions in newer technologies, such as DVD players, digital music and video
game players, and software-based multimedia devices. And, as discussed in Part
I, they have participated in efforts to develop trusted systems functionality for
digital media files and digital broadcast content. In part this behavior reflects
simple self-interest; a large consumer electronics manufacturer must, if it
wishes to maintain market share, manufacture DVD players capable of playing
commercially-released DVDs. Some firms in this category, such as Sony, are
also content providers or affiliated with content providers; for these firms, the
calculus of costs and benefits is even more complex and depends on the relative
power and profitability of the affected business units. In part, however, con-
sumer electronics manufacturers’ very different responses to different technology-
based initiatives reflect the fact that consumer expectations regarding new
methods of distributing and rendering multimedia content are less fully formed.
102. The remainder of this section extends and deepens the preliminary analysis sketched in Julie E.
Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 614–15 (2003).
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Acquiescing to content industry demands regarding copy-protection for DVD-
based movies did not carry the same level of perceived marketplace risk as it
does for CD-based music or free broadcast television.
Large Internet service providers confront an equally complex calculus. Many
of these providers initially resisted content industry demands for identification
of individual subscribers accused of engaging in p2p file-sharing.103 But the
large telephone and cable companies that provide most residential Internet
access also have other agendas of their own. Many of these companies seek to
use their newly-installed, high-speed fiber-optic networks to establish quality of
service pricing, and to deliver their own proprietary content to subscribers.104
Therefore, they are not generally averse to technologies for flagging and sorting
network traffic. Cable companies also have participated in the ongoing effort to
develop a regulatory framework establishing trusted systems protection for
cable television content.105
The interplay of supply and demand in the market for technological protec-
tion is further complicated by the dynamics of technical standardization. Be-
cause most copyright owners lack the technical expertise to build TPMs or
trusted systems technologies for themselves, they must hire others to do it for
them. Technology companies and researchers therefore play pivotal roles in the
development and extension of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement.
Technologies, like other artifacts, are designed with particular specifications
in mind; thus, technology companies do not seek simply to build the “best”
system, but rather to build the best system for a given purpose or set of
purposes.106 As in any other market, those purposes are determined at least in
part by the customer, and here again it is incorrect to assume that the most
relevant customer is the end user. In the case of technological standards that
mediate interactions with copyrighted content, it is increasingly the large con-
tent industries, and to some extent lawmakers, that developers must first aim to
please. Within the fledgling “digital rights management” industry, vendors
compete vigorously with one another to win the content industries’ business.
Members of this industry also have learned to press their interests before
legislators with increasing sophistication. Unaffiliated and academic researchers
have been more inclined to cast a critical eye on these processes.107 Perhaps
103. See supra note 58.
104. For discussion of these initiatives, see Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2007).
105. See Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices and Compatibility Between Cable Systems
and Consumer Electronics Equipment, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,728 (Nov. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
pts. 15, 76).
106. Cf. DONALD MACKENZIE, KNOWING MACHINES: ESSAYS ON TECHNICAL CHANGE 54–63 (1996)
(arguing against the belief that technological developments have fixed trajectories that are innately
determined); WINNER, supra note 74 (arguing that “technology” is not an autonomous force, but rather
politics by other means); Steve Woolgar, Configuring the User, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS
ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION 57 (John Law ed. 1991).
107. See, e.g., Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com.
34 [Vol. 95:1THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
even more than their colleagues at for-profit companies, however, these individu-
als are highly motivated to solve the difficult theoretical problems that instantia-
tion of this functionality requires.108
For developers of trusted systems functionality, the mix of incentives, strate-
gies, and habitual practice is even more complicated. In particular, developers
of computer operating systems and microprocessors must satisfy many groups
of customers. As already noted, some developers, including most notably
market leaders Microsoft and Intel, appear to believe that trusted systems
capabilities mesh well with other design goals, such as enhanced network,
server, and file security. For Microsoft in particular, deployment of this function-
ality also seems bound up with a number of other business-related objectives,
including protection of its proprietary technical information and preservation of
its market position vis-a`-vis open source software.109 Other technical develop-
ers are less certain about the benefits of trusted systems functionality, but seek
to avoid “technology mandates” from the government, and appear to perceive
voluntary development efforts as the lesser of two evils. It is worth noting,
finally, that “technology mandates” can take many forms. The government is
also an important customer for trusted systems technologies, which it sees as
serving other security-related goals.110
The choices and practices of content intermediaries and standards developers do
not prevent end users from resisting functionality that they find undesirable or
offensive, but they make resistance more difficult and therefore less likely. Within the
market for protected content, user resistance might manifest either as refusal to buy or
as refusal to submit to the discipline of the technology. As discussed in Part I, early
versions of surface-level technological protection have provoked both kinds of user
pushback. At higher levels of penetration, however, both kinds of market resistance
become more difficult. The more deeply embedded trusted systems functionality
becomes, the harder it will be to avoid by purchasing noncompliant or alternative
equipment. Particularly as more and more desired features and services are bundled
with this functionality, the costs of opting out may rapidly come to outweigh the
benefits.111 For all but a small group of technically skilled end users, more deeply
embedded controls also are much harder to evade by circumvention.
108. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (2005);
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (2004); PROCEEDINGS OF THE
3RD ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (2003). All of these collections are available via
http://portal.acm.org/browse_dl.cfm?linked1&partseries&idxSERIES11158&collACM&dl
ACM&CFID72913374&CFTOKEN59431387. Cf. Bourdieu, supra note 93, at 138–39 (“The
scientific field, this scholastic universe where the most brutal constraints of the ordinary social world
are bracketed, is the locus of the genesis of a new form of necessity . . . in it the logical constraints
. . . take the form of social constraints (and vice versa).”).
109. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., Shared Source Initiative: Open Source Software (Feb. 1, 2004),
http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/Government/opensource.mspx.
110. For discussion of the emerging “security-industrial complex,” see ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO
PLACE TO HIDE (2005).
111. See also Zittrain, supra note 49 (arguing that many consumers will choose to run only trusted
applications and files because they fear malware attacks).
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At higher levels of trusted systems penetration, moreover, open source
software may no longer provide a viable alternative for individuals who want
lawful, “normal” access to mainstream media content. There are already some
formidable institutional obstacles to the development of open source media
players that incorporate the required technological protection functionality. I
have noted that industry-sanctioned standards are licensed as trade secrets,
under conditions that forbid licensees from altering or disclosing information
about how they work. Because both disclosure and unrestricted evolution are
central tenets of open source philosophy and practice, open source developers
are unlikely to accept these restrictions, and devices incorporating the restric-
tions will not qualify as open source products.112 Reverse engineering to
develop unlicensed open source media players most likely violates the DMCA.
The statutory exception for reverse engineering does not shelter efforts to
achieve format interoperability for digital content that is not itself a computer
program; in any case, that exception also forbids widespread sharing of the
information gained from reverse engineering.113
In theory, more meaningful possibilities for end-user resistance might arise in
the market for standards, at the point where policy is inscribed in technology.
Here, though, users must be determined enough and informed enough to
overcome a series of significant hurdles, including the relative opacity of
computing infrastructures, the need to understand and appreciate the signifi-
cance of automated enforcement measures long before implementations surface
in the consumer marketplace, the closed nature of many standard-setting pro-
cesses, and the technical complexity of the subject matter.114 Some consumer
advocacy groups have begun to do exactly this; what remains to be seen is
whether these efforts will generate enough critical mass to affect the content of
technological protection standards.
Finally, the ideology of the marketplace itself reinforces the extension of
pervasively distributed copyright enforcement, in two distinct and opposite
ways. The first involves the mirror image of the argument about motives for
privatization made above: Just as privatization legitimates self-enforcing autho-
rization and constraint, so privatized authorization and constraint reinforce the
112. This perhaps explains the fact that although the DVD-CCA has issued several licenses to
develop open-source DVD players that incorporate CSS decryption capability, and trumpeted this fact
in the DeCSS litigation, no DVD player that is both fully open-source and capable of installation on a
Linux operating system has actually been developed. See Keith J. Winstein, Real Dialogue: The Tech
Interviews Jack Valenti, THE TECH, Apr. 16, 2004, http://www-tech.mit.edu/V124/N20/
ValentiIntervie.20f.html. For discussion of the divergence between open source methodologies and the
trusted systems approach, see GILLESPIE, supra note 4, ch. 8.
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).
114. Cf. GURAK, supra note 99, at 66–83 (describing how the technical complexity of the issues
surrounding deployment of the Clipper Chip created obstacles to the generation of a popular protest
movement).
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perception that the discipline imposed is freely chosen by arms-length contract-
ing parties. Second, to the extent that industry enforcement and public education
efforts fuel popular resistance to pervasively distributed copyright enforcement,
increased popular resistance in turn fuels and legitimates the rhetoric of crisis
and the extension of technologies to control it. Any ratcheting up of crisis
mentality increases the downside risks of contributory infringement liability for
independent entrepreneurs and government oversight for standards developers.
In short, even as pervasively distributed copyright enforcement fails to convince
end users, it strengthens its hold on the intermediaries whose products, services,
and standards define the end-user marketplace.
For all of these reasons, we might predict both that pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement must be privatized and decentralized to be effective, and
that at least some such initiatives might well succeed. Once again, it is impor-
tant to note that this analysis is provisional and speculative; it remains possible
that the nascent relationships of power, authority, and acquiescence could be
disrupted in important ways. The point simply is that the dynamics of market-
place acceptance and rejection are complicated, and that choices available in
markets are not inconsistent with, and may enable, the imposition of highly
restrictive disciplinary regimes that many market participants experience as
onerous—regimes justified by crisis and internalized as obligation. In important
and mutually reinforcing ways, the recursive practices of market actors lend
authority to the linked strategies of crisis management.
IV. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE PRODUCTION OF NETWORKED SPACE
Thus far, I have simply attempted to describe the emerging social phenom-
enon of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement and locate it within a
rough taxonomy of disciplinary practices, without questioning either the logic
of the disease metaphor as applied to online copyright infringement or the
efficacy of the proposed cure. It is time to take stock. How should we think
about the discipline that this vision, if brought to fruition, would inculcate?
Here it is important to consider the speech libertarian objection very carefully.
Perhaps the sort of control that pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
seeks to instantiate simply cannot be achieved. Perhaps, then, pervasively
distributed copyright enforcement simply will not matter very much. The first
conclusion is probably right, but the second does not follow.
Evaluating pervasively distributed copyright enforcement requires careful
consideration of both its benefits and the other changes that normalization of
this particular form of crisis discipline is likely to produce. The analysis must
begin by acknowledging that the opposite of “discipline” is not freedom, but
anarchy. The terms “society” and “civilization” necessarily presuppose function-
ing disciplinary mechanisms: institutions that apply (and act upon) shared
values to mediate and structure human interaction. To all except the most
dedicated pessimist, the ubiquity of discipline is a good thing, not a bad thing; it
is what enables collective political, social, and economic enterprise. The larger
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question, then, is not “whether discipline?” but “what discipline?” In particular,
we must consider whether normalization of crisis management would serve a
broader range of productive interests, and whether it would further or frustrate
important noninstrumental values.
To the extent that pervasively distributed copyright enforcement enables
detection, punishment, and/or prevention of large-scale copyright infringe-
ments, it will produce some clear benefits. These benefits, moreover, are not
exclusively private; society as a whole derives important benefits from a stable
system of intellectual property protection. Within both markets and firms,
intellectual property rights facilitate the productive organization of economic
activity, with a variety of attendant welfare gains. Persistent and important
distributional objections to this activity should not cause us to overlook the
considerable good it also generates. Society as a whole also derives benefits
from the productive resolution of crisis, and more particularly from the working
out of strategies for adapting sustainably to technological change.
The extent of both benefits, however, is open to considerable debate. Many
argue that a system of intellectual property protection produces the greatest
social gain when rules granting protection are balanced by offsetting limits. One
can acknowledge the benefits of clear intellectual property entitlements while
still reserving rather substantial questions about how much protection and how
much enforcement are optimal. Similarly, some resolutions of crisis are more
productive than others. The first problem has been analyzed exhaustively
elsewhere; here, I will focus on the second. Let us consider now some addi-
tional entailments of the normalization of this particular mode of discipline.
The shift to crisis management is intended first and foremost to affect the
ways in which individual users of information goods experience flows of
information; thus, it is important to begin by asking how individuals experience
information and what they use it for. Discussions of these questions within the
legal literature have tended to assume a set of disembodied, purposive interac-
tions. This model does not lend itself well to understanding what the shift to
pervasively distributed copyright enforcement represents. Research in human
cognition suggests that reasoning and perception are embodied: We perceive
features of our immediate environment through and in relation to the embodied,
situated self, and formulate physical and spatial metaphors to convey abstract
concepts.115 The list of metaphors commonly used to describe information-
related activities, both online and off, bears out these conclusions. On the
network we surf, visit sites and domains, download files, and post messages;
within our private computing environments we consume cultural products,
absorb and digest facts and opinions, advance arguments, and rip, mix, and burn
sounds and images. From the individual perspective, the information environ-
115. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 16–59
(1999).
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ment is defined by the sum total of these activities and is experienced spatially,
in terms of the freedom of movement it permits.116 Processes of information
access and use within this environment are not entirely purposive, but are
structured importantly by chance encounters and fortuitous juxtapositions. Situ-
ated, embodied users appropriate the information that they encounter for inter-
linked purposes of consumption, communication, self-development, and creative
play, and the result of these behaviors is the larger landscape of cultural and
communicative activity.117
Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement portends fundamental change
in these processes. The linked regimes of authorization and constraint will
constrict the “breathing room” that is a critical constituent of each of them. The
interpolation of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement into formerly
private spaces redraws the experienced boundary between private and public,
producing at the intersection a third sort of space that is neither entirely private
nor conventionally public. The practice of intellectual consumption under a
regime of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement seems likely to com-
bine the exposure of behavior in public spaces (but not the expressive privi-
leges) with the isolation of private spaces (but not the security against
intrusion).118 Although concerns about the inviolability of personal spaces are
often couched in the language of privacy rights, that language seems insufficient
to comprehend these changes. The interpolation of copyright enforcement
functions into private spaces, and private intellectual activities conducted from
within those spaces, works a kind of displacement that is no less real because it
is nonphysical.
At both the individual level and the network level, pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement seeks to produce standardized, predictable flows of
information. Michael Madison has argued that, just as early twentieth-century
urban planning moved to eliminate visual chaos and replace it with order, so the
technical and contractual mediation of information flows threatens to eliminate
the diversity of textures and “feels” that flourishes under less restrictive architec-
tures.119 This insight reaches beyond “information” abstracted from time and
116. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007) (arguing that the networked information environment is experienced in terms of embodied
spatiality).
117. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 370–73
(2005).
118. Donna Haraway provides an evocative account of the relation between information flows and
the spaces of the body, and of the ways that this relation might be shaped by an “informatics of
domination.” DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN 149–81 (1991). She observes: “One
should expect control strategies to concentrate on boundary conditions and interfaces, on rates of flow
across boundaries . . . . Human beings, like any other component or subsystem, must be localized in a
system architecture whose basic modes of operation are probabilistic, statistical. No objects, bodies, or
spaces are sacred in themselves . . . .” Id. at 163.
119. Michael J. Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
125 (2000); cf. Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2005) (noting this risk in the context of RFID-based information systems and
2006] 39PERVASIVELY DISTRIBUTED COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT
place, and indeed, on its own terms, it must reach more broadly. The shifting of
intellectual activities into the controlled and authorized spaces of pervasively
distributed copyright enforcement is in some respects comparable in feel to the
replacement of mixed-use urban landscape with a large shopping mall or
housing development. If these changes are to operate, as we are told they must,
upon the entire information landscape, the scope of the resulting dislocation will
be enormous.
If one keeps in mind that the central concern of pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement is discipline as opposed to simple prohibition, none of
this should come as a great surprise. Foucault reminded us that geographic
segregation, rank-ordering, and internalization can be effective disciplinary
substitutes for more extreme measures of social control. Nonetheless, the
techniques of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement betoken a qualita-
tive shift in the extent and nature of the structuring process that operates at the
“normal” end of the spectrum. As already noted, moreover, state sovereigns are
not indifferent to the possibility of inserting control and surveillance functions
into communications networks. In the realm of online communication, disciplin-
ary regimes designed for one purpose can easily be adapted to others. Embed-
ded controls that identify and locate information users also lend themselves well
to the reproduction of territorial sovereignty.120 The adaptation and territorializa-
tion of control and surveillance functions can empower sovereigns to combat
purely local plagues—terrorism, or pornography, or hate speech, or dissent.
Through pervasively distributed copyright enforcement, state sovereigns may
realize their own dreams of control, and far more easily than they could have
done directly.
Here, however, we come to the speech libertarian objection: Surely it is going
a bit far to say that the normalization of crisis mode strips individuals of
whatever agency and private space they possess? There is, after all, a certain
irony in structuralist defenses of individual freedom.121 If we are to take
individual freedom seriously, must not we also take seriously the individual
capacity to resist rules and practices that seem unwarranted and unjust? In
particular, as poststructuralist critiques of intellectual property law reiterate, the
mere fact that society adopts rules to govern the permissible use of intellectual
property by no means ensures that individuals will obey them. Individuals are
not simply passive recipients of cultural goods, but construct their own mean-
ings by acts of resistance and appropriation.122 If new obstacles to these
arguing that these systems should be designed and implemented in a way that fosters diversity of
sources, viewpoints, and uses).
120. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 26 (2002).
121. For a particularly insightful version of this critique, see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM
(1997).
122. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPRO-
PRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998); Negativland, Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 239 (2003); David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and
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practices appear, individuals will find ways around them. Here the poststructural-
ist critique achieves an unlikely fusion with a distinctly cyberlibertarian vision
of the agency of information users: If pervasively distributed copyright enforce-
ment is this bad, people will refuse to accept it, and if it is foisted upon them,
they will sabotage it. In addition, the strategies described in Part I have
catalyzed the emergence of what one might characterize as “pervasively distrib-
uted copyright resistance”123: a diverse, decentralized set of efforts to counter,
undermine, and reverse the initiatives on which pervasively distributed copy-
right enforcement relies.
In the literal sense, this critique is quite right. Many of the measures
described above are aspirational; there are no guarantees that they will find
acceptance among information users and technology providers and no guaran-
tees that they will work as claimed. Most likely, even universal implementation
of the full range of enforcement measures sought by the entertainment indus-
tries will not ensure their universal success, and will fail to produce perfect
regularity of discipline within the information environment. Technically-skilled
risk-takers will be able to hack the code, defeat the watchers, and nurture
thriving darknets. Some will choose open source systems and will develop ways
to spoof the hard-wired detectors. And some will become passionate, dedicated
advocates for resistance, reframing, and reversal. Perfect panopticism, in other
words, is unattainable. The digital world will remain an arena in which conflict-
ing spatial practices and visions struggle for primacy.
Preventing all unauthorized uses of information, however, is not the point of
pervasively distributed copyright enforcement, just as preventing every single
death was not the point of medieval plague control regimes and preventing
every single crime is not the point of prisons. The opposite is more nearly true;
as Foucault explained, to perform its function as a mechanism of social disci-
pline the modern penal system requires crime, or at least criminals, in steady
supply.124 Normal discipline requires deviance constantly produced and care-
fully defined. Normalized crisis management adopts as an additional leitmotif
the specter of barely averted, always imminent collapse. The darknet serves
both needs.
The interplay between authorized uses and the darknet will recast the options
available to both ordinary and technically-skilled information users. As Rose-
mary Coombe has explained, the rules that govern the use of intellectual goods
can expand or constrict the available scope for the construction of difference
through creative appropriation.125 In conditions of postmodernity, which have
been characterized in part by the accumulation of informational capital and its
exchange via global communications networks, these rules have trended inexora-
Transformative Critical Appropriation (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available
at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf.
123. Thanks to Michael Birnhack for supplying this term.
124. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 70, at 82–103.
125. COOMBE, supra note 122.
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bly toward increasing constriction even as the popular claim of right to engage
in acts of creative (or destructive) appropriation has become more acute.126 This
is doubly true of the technical and contractual mechanisms that extend auto-
mated enforcement into the spaces of intellectual consumption, and therefore
affect not only the legality but also the literal feasibility of resistance. Perva-
sively distributed copyright enforcement operates upon difference and resis-
tance to produce homogenous, abstract, carefully controlled space, within which
even difference and resistance follow more narrowly prescribed paths.127
More generally, the rules that shape the spaces of intellectual consumption
can expand or constrict the available scope for law- and norm-creating activities
by private individuals and their communities. This dynamic is starkest in the
case of automated enforcement effectuated by surface-level restrictions and
trusted systems. Automated enforcement via authorization and constraint elides
the difference between public/rule-governed behavior and private behavior that
is far more loosely circumscribed by applicable rules and social norms.128 Some
offenses, most notably crimes against persons, are so severe that they may be
thought to justify such elision.129 In other cases, though, we might conclude that
looseness of fit between public rules and private behavior is itself a social good.
Where the precise contours of legal rules are unclear, or the proper application
of legal rules to particular facts is contested—which is to say, in most cases—
imperfect control of private conduct shields a range of experimentation that
involves individuals and communities in the creation of law and furthers the
value-balancing goals of a sound and inclusive public policy.130
For all of these reasons, neither the postmodern counterhegemon nor the
law-creating citizen fares especially well under the sort of regime that perva-
sively distributed copyright enforcement seeks to instantiate. Crisis manage-
ment mediated through and by the information environment narrowly
circumscribes the possibility for opposition, deliberative dialogue, and every-
thing in between. These costs of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
should not lightly be dismissed as insignificant, or as wholly subject to nullifica-
tion through interstitial strategies of resistance. From the standpoint of informa-
126. See COOMBE, supra note 122, at 47–52. As Yochai Benkler demonstrates, these are not
necessary conditions of an information-based economy. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NET-
WORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). But they are the conditions
that have predominated so far.
127. Cf. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 319–20 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans.,
Blackwell 1991) (1974) (“[I]n a brightly illuminated night the day’s prohibitions give way to profitable
pseudo-transgressions.”).
128. An earlier version of the argument in this paragraph appears in Cohen, supra note 102, at
587–88.
129. It is worth noting, however, that we are far from certain about this. In particular, ANTHONY
BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962), is a powerful manifesto against the use of behavioral
engineering to constrain volition in precisely the circumstances that might be considered most compel-
ling.
130. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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tion users, all of this seems rather a large price to pay for better copyright
enforcement, more orderly information markets, and the stabilization of norms
about information use.
Here, though, it is necessary to consider the views of a final group of critics:
those who believe that the rhetoric of crisis is apt and that a shift to crisis
management is the only defensible response. This belief need not rest solely on
economic self-interest; many believe that a healthy system of copyright protec-
tion and the system of market production that it enables are essential prerequi-
sites for expressive liberty and so for intellectual self-determination.131 If there
is indeed a crisis, and if pervasively distributed copyright enforcement is the
best way to manage it, the price may seem inevitable. Neither proposition is
certain. From a practical standpoint, however, the latter proposition seems both
more important and more amenable to reasoned evaluation. Part V discusses the
considerations that should inform this inquiry.
V. TAKING IMPERFECTION SERIOUSLY
I have argued that pervasively distributed copyright enforcement supplies a
novel template for social discipline in the information age, and one that we
ought to think twice about. Crisis management seems most essential, and
interstitial strategies of resistance most significant, if there is no other way to
achieve an acceptable balance between protection of intellectual content and
preservation of personal liberties. The proper balance between enforcement and
restraint is an age-old question in market-democratic societies, and solutions
have always entailed compromise. It would be odd if the advent of digital
networked technologies altered this dynamic so completely that middle-ground
possibilities ceased to exist. If so, then our choices are far richer than we have
been led to believe, and do not reduce to a stark election between pervasively
distributed copyright enforcement and information anarchy.
At this point, however, I may seem to be trapped in a dilemma of my own
making. I have argued that the form of discipline that pervasively distributed
copyright enforcement represents is both qualitatively different from earlier
modes of discipline and normatively undesirable. In the networked information
age, it is inevitable that we will have a form of discipline that incorporates some
form of regulation-by-protocol and therefore presupposes some degree of coordi-
nation. If the political critique that I have offered applies equally to all forms of
regulation-by-protocol, we are in trouble. In particular, it is difficult to see how
one might reconcile the argument made in Part II with the argument made in the
previous paragraph, which contemplates the existence of a productive middle
ground.
My answer to this question is a Foucauldian one: Some form of discipline we
131. The now-classic version of this argument is Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Demo-
cratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). See also TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL
CULTURE (1998) (arguing that market economies foster artistic vitality and diversity).
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must have. The political implications of a shift to regulation-by-protocol can be
minimized only by commitment to what in Foucauldian terms might be charac-
terized as an ethic of problematization: a commitment to uncovering and
interrogating the systems of categorization and valuation implicit in patterns of
social ordering, and to demonstrating that they are neither natural nor inevi-
table.132 This process in turn opens the way for new, as-yet-unpredicted patterns
of ordering to emerge. In the age of regulation-by-protocol, an ethic of problema-
tization must focus not only on the social construction of knowledge, but on the
social construction of technical design.
Architectural regulation has a dual character. It is both a qualitatively differ-
ent mode of regulating conduct and a mode of regulation that encompasses a
continuum of regulatory effects. As an example, consider the conventional
practice of engineering cars to prevent them from being driven above a certain
speed. Formally, speed exists on a continuum. As a practical matter, however, it
matters enormously—qualitatively—whether the hardwired maximum is set to
equal the legal speed limit or, say, 110 miles per hour. The first solution is a
form of crisis management; it leaves no room to go faster even when doing so
would ease traffic flow or save lives. The second preserves both literal freedom
of movement and a corresponding moral and political agency. In the context of
speed controllers, we understand the difference well. But the problem is easy
precisely because the regulation is so crude. Regulation-by-protocol is capable
of immensely greater precision than other sorts of architectural regulation,133
but it does not follow that this capability should therefore be developed to its
fullest extent. We are not as good at understanding where and how algorithmic
precision shades into coercion. Instead, as the current vogue for regulation-by-
protocol demonstrates, we are peculiarly vulnerable to the seductive rationality
of approaches that combine precise architectural targeting with other, subtler
forms of behavioral engineering. Consider now the current debate about the
practice of engineering rental cars to report driving over a designated maximum
speed, and then automatically levying large penalties against those renters.134
This is a regime of crisis management that differs from regulation-by-speed
controller only in its sophistication. Formally, it leaves agency in place; practi-
cally, however, it seeks to harness and normalize patterns of authorization and
constraint to produce drivers who exercise agency only within substantially
narrowed confines.
132. See, e.g., Foucault, supra note 91, at 222–26 (outlining a method for the analysis of power
relations within society).
133. Cf. James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1730–32 (2005)
(arguing that software is characterized by greater “plasticity” than physical architecture and therefore is
a separate regulatory modality in its own right).
134. See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Connecticut’s Speeder-Friendly Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2001, at A19; Anita Ramasastry, Tracking Every Move You Make: Can Car Rental Companies Use
Technology to Monitor Our Driving?, FINDLAW’S WRIT (Aug. 23, 2005), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
ramasastry/20050823.html. I thank David McGowan for this example, especially because it proves
more than he thinks it does.
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In the largest sense, the question that needs to be answered is whether the
technology-based strategies of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
can be said to be “inherently” authoritarian, in the sense that their deployment
and administration presuppose and reproduce authoritarian social structures, or
whether these technologies might have implementations that are compatible
with the preservation of a broader range of individual freedoms and a broader
diversity of information spaces.135 Both Lessig and Galloway seem to think the
latter. For Lessig, anti-authoritarianism subsists in those protocols that are least
amenable to centralized control and most transparent to end users.136 For
Galloway, it subsists in patterns of flow that are “rhizomic”: that are immanent
in structure rather than predetermined by authority.137 But both appear to
believe that absent coordinated legal intervention on behalf of powerful, rent-
seeking industries, market or extramarket forces would drive toward this result.
I have argued that we should not necessarily expect this outcome, and that the
forces pushing toward the instantiation of crisis management are exceptionally
powerful precisely because they are decentralized.
The dynamic described in Part III suggests that if we are to avoid authoritar-
ian forms of regulation-by-protocol, the parameters that enable anti-authoritar-
ian outcomes must be designed. This conclusion may seem to frame a second,
equally irreconcilable dilemma. It may seem that to talk about the design of
discipline is necessarily to engage in an authoritarian enterprise.138 This objec-
tion is enormously important. To reconcile design with freedom, it will be
necessary to think about and practice design in a different way than we are used
to doing. In that spirit, I would like to close by putting two questions on the
table, one theoretical and one practical.
On the theoretical level, designing for imperfect control of individual behav-
ior requires a rigorous inquiry into the location of the boundary between
regulation and coercion, and into the normative justifications for choosing
imperfection rather than simply settling for it. Much important work has been
135. This framing of the determinism question is Langdon Winner’s. See LANGDON WINNER, THE
WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1986); see also WINNER,
supra note 74, at 325–35 (calling for an “epistemological Luddism” that would consider “at least the
following: (1) the kinds of human dependency and regularized behavior centering upon specific
varieties of apparatus, (2) the patterns of social activity that rationalized techniques imprint upon
human relationships, and (3) the shapes given everyday life by the large-scale organized networks of
technology”). For preliminary explorations of this question in the context of DRM technologies, see
Timothy K. Armstrong, DRM and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming Fall
2006); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001); Deirdre Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limita-
tions in Rights Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: ACM CCS-9 WORKSHOP, DRM
2002, at 137 (Joan Feigenbaum ed., 2003).
136. LESSIG, supra note 74.
137. GALLOWAY, supra note 90.
138. Cf. Mark Tushnet, “Everything Old Is New Again”: Reflections on the “New Chicago School,”
1998 WIS. L. REV. 579 (arguing that proposals for norm engineering are inconsistent with classical
liberal policy of distinguishing between conduct, which may be punished, and belief, which may not be
punished).
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done on these questions.139 Yet much more remains to be done. In the age of
regulation-by-protocol, theoretical justifications for choosing imperfection must
be carefully linked to the practices, spaces, and contexts within and through
which individuals experience the information environment, and the ways in
which authorization and constraint alter those experiences. An example of a
literature that attempts this sort of task is the postmodernist literature on
architecture and the event, which attempts to articulate in a systematic, concrete
way both the experienced connections between architecture and constraint and
the case for disrupting settled expectations about how we live just enough that
new patterns of living might emerge.140 This does not mean that event theorists
advocate or seek to produce chaos; rather, they seek to encourage thinking
differently about the relationship between physical structure and social struc-
ture, and about the ways in which physical structure both creates possibility and
forecloses impossibility. Cautioning that prediction too is a form of control, they
focus on the ways in which discontinuity and disjunction in the built environ-
ment might leave room for the impossible (judged against current referents) to
emerge. These principles are well-suited to inform the design of intellectual
space; what is needed here is a formal, detailed elaboration of the relationship(s)
between the structure of experienced space and the processes of artistic and
intellectual exploration.141
On the practical level, designing for imperfection requires specifying con-
crete parameters for enabling conduct that cannot be predicted or even imagined
in advance. This requires a reversal of the current emphasis on enhancing the
precision of digital delivery systems. A general model for the sort of effort that I
have in mind may be found in the movement toward value-centered design,
which stresses the iterative articulation of and engagement with normative
values throughout the design process.142 Adapting this model to the task of
139. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 126; JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); COOMBE, supra note 122; LESSIG, supra note 74;
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); Jack M. Balkin,
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Boyle, supra note 75; Boyle, supra note 78; Julie E. Cohen, A
Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 981 (1996); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); Reidenberg, supra note 74;
Samuelson, supra note 16.
140. See, e.g., JOHN RAJCHMAN, What’s New in Architecture?, in PHILOSOPHICAL EVENTS: ESSAYS OF
THE ’80S 152 (1991); BERNARD TSCHUMI, ARCHITECTURE AND DISJUNCTION (1994).
141. For efforts in this direction, see Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture:
Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 146–60 (P.B. Hugenholtz & L.
Guibault, eds. 2006); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007); Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1
(2004); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available
at http://chicagoip.com/lawfulpersonaluse.pdf.
142. See generally BATYA FRIEDMAN, PETER H. KAHN, JR. & ALAN BORNING, VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN:
THEORY AND METHODS (2002), ftp://ftp.cs.washington.edu/tr/2002/12/UW-CSE-02-12-01.pdf; BATYA
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designing for imperfection, however, requires pushing beyond more specific
normative visions, which tend to presuppose a degree of predictability, toward
strategies for encoding gaps within which the impossible might emerge.
Here is an example of the sort of thing I don’t mean to suggest143: Many
designs for surface-level technical protections now explicitly incorporate a
degree of “wiggle room” for the user. For example, a song downloaded from
Apple’s iTunes store can be saved to five different computers,144 and this
feature has been hailed as a turn toward more consumer-friendly technological
protection. That may be so, but it doesn’t herald a turn toward the other sorts of
constitutive freedoms that I have described. We still know where all of the
copies are, and we have a pretty good idea how they are being used. To that
extent, the iTunes platform is a digital Disneyland; it is play carefully engi-
neered and tightly controlled. The iTunes platform also allows users to burn
unlimited copies of songs to CDs and to rip unprotected mp3 files from the
CDs.145 This feature comes closer to enabling constitutive freedoms, but the
terms of Apple’s clickwrap license appear to prohibit many of the actions that
users might wish to take.146 And if CDs and CD burners go the way of analog
cassette tapes, or are redesigned to behave differently, the theoretical freedom to
“burn, rip, and mix” would be much less significant as a practical matter. What
this example tends to suggest, then, is that even when we think we are choosing
imperfection, we may not really mean it. Wiggle room and freedom of move-
ment are not the same. Consumptive freedom is important, but it is not the only
sort of freedom with which copyright policy and more broadly political theory
should be concerned. Choosing imperfection requires the deliberate design and
implementation of systems that incorporate far more tolerance for freedom of
movement, and that therefore enable digital files to be accessed, copied, and
used in as-yet-unpredicted ways.147
Here are some examples of the sort of thing that I do mean to suggest: If
wholly uncontrolled global distribution is the problem, set permissions levels so
high that the limits would constrain only users who attempt to share hundreds or
even thousands of copies; the resulting freedom to copy would enable some
“merely” consumptive use, but also might afford fortuitous inspiration to the
FRIEDMAN, VALUE-SENSITIVE DESIGN: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1999), http://
www.ischool.washington.edu/vsd/files/friedman99VSD_Research_Agenda.pdf; HUMAN VALUES AND THE
DESIGN OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (Batya Friedman ed., 1997) (collecting essays and case studies that
explore the intersection between human values and technical design).
143. Although some of my earlier work may fairly be read to suggest it. See Burk & Cohen, supra
note 135.
144. See BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, DIGITAL MEDIA PROJECT,
ITUNES: HOW COPYRIGHT, CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL MEDIA—A CASE
STUDY 11–16 (Berkman Publ’ns Series No. 2004-07, 2004).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 15–16.
147. Cf. Armstrong, supra note 135, at 5–6 (calling for “systems that unlock the process of fair
use”); id. at 46–53 (proposing an architecture that would allow user override of technical restrictions
subject to an “identity escrow” requirement).
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next Picasso or provide the tools for self-determination to the next Gandhi. If
true “piracy” is the problem, link liability for the manufacture, distribution, or
use of circumvention tools to an infringing purpose; the resulting freedom to
tinker would enable both as-yet-unpredicted uses and the development of
as-yet-unpredicted platforms and tools.148 If exponentially enhanced anonymity
of true “pirates” is the problem, deploy watermarking technologies to create
audit trails that lead only partway to any individual user; the resulting freedom
to behave badly would preserve moral and political agency while leaving
content providers no better or worse off than they are with respect to efforts to
discover and punish unauthorized analog reproduction. If malware is the prob-
lem, adopt open “trusted systems” standards that would enable multiple, compet-
ing providers to authenticate files and applications as “trusted”; the resulting
freedom to compete would enable more precise differentiation between true
threats and legitimate market alternatives.
Any of these approaches would entail not simply tolerating, but rather
embracing, an enforcement equilibrium that includes a much higher proportion
of unauthorized conduct, and for some that may make these approaches norma-
tively undesirable for other reasons. The key point here, however, is not that
such an equilibrium would be ideal either from the perspective of those who
seek perfect control or from the perspective of those who seek perfect freedom,
but rather that it still would fall well short of constituting “crisis” from either
perspective. For exactly that reason, it would do a much better job of accommo-
dating the competing goods that I have described.
148. See Samuelson, supra note 16.
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